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ABSTRACT 
Research has shown that people often fail to notice changes to visual scenes. This 
phenomenon is known as change blindness. This study investigated the effect of 
facial feature transformations on change blindness using change detection tasks 
involving a person as the object of change. 301 participants viewed a photo-story 
comprised of a few still frames. In the final frame, a selected facial feature of a 
character in the story was altered. Four different photo-stories were used, each 
utilising a different alteration. Questionnaires designed to determine whether the 
change was detected were administered.  Results showed that changes to facial 
features considered to be more salient produced higher levels of change detection. 
A flicker test using the same images from the photo-story was administered to a 
further 75 participants and showed a similar pattern of results. It was concluded 
that in order to detect change, the changing stimuli have to be both salient and 
meaningful. 
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1 OVERVIEW 
This study aims to investigate the effect of facial feature salience on the change 
blindness phenomenon in a change detection task involving a person as the object 
of change. The change blindness phenomenon was selected for investigation due 
to its striking and surprising nature, its consistent popularity in the field of 
cognitive research, and the fact that while change blindness experiments have 
been extensive and able to demonstrate the robustness of the phenomenon across a 
wide variety of scenarios and tasks, a number of issues remain open to 
investigation. Among these is the question of what draws attention to some scene 
elements and not others in change detection tasks. The primary motivation for the 
present study was to set up an experiment that may begin to address this question. 
In Chapter  2, change blindness is defined, with particular reference to the various 
definitions of change and how these can guide the investigation and understanding 
of change blindness, both theoretically and operationally. A distinction is drawn 
between change blindness and inattentional blindness, as these two terms are 
sometimes used interchangeably in the literature.  
This is followed by a review of the various studies conducted on change 
blindness, with its simple-stimuli centred beginnings in  laboratory experiments in 
the 1950s to the more elaborate and naturalistic experiments used in contemporary 
change blindness research. This review shows that change blindness can be 
demonstrated in a broad array of scenarios and with varying stimuli, fuelling 
interest in the phenomenon as a possible platform for deepening an understanding 
of visual processes, attention and memory. The role of attention and memory in 
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change blindness is explored in the section that follows, and various theories and 
studies that attempt to explain the change blindness phenomenon are discussed.  
Chapter  3 delineates the motivation for the use of faces as the chosen stimulus in 
this study. The nature of the face as an object likely to receive preferential 
attention is discussed, and differences between the stimuli employed in this study 
and those used in other change blindness experiments are outlined. This is 
accompanied by an overview of the mechanisms involved in facial recognition, 
and how these may differ from mechanisms involved in the recognition and 
processing of non-face objects. Given that this study isolates particular facial 
features in the hope of establishing a relationship between feature salience and the 
resulting level of change detection, a section of this chapter addresses 
experimental and theoretical discussions suggesting that facial features are a 
legitimate and sensible unit of perception that can be investigated operationally. A 
review of studies on the salience of isolated facial features is also included.  
Chapter 4 outlines the motivations for and aims of this research. Chapter  5 
describes the methods employed by the present study, including a detailed 
description of the designs, samples, instruments, procedures, and analyses used in 
the experiments. In Chapter  6 the results of the experiments are presented. 
Finally, Chapter  7 contains a discussion of the findings outlined in Chapter  6 and 
the relevance of these in view of the arguments and theoretical issues highlighted 
in the literature review. The various limitations of the study are discussed and 
recommendations for future research which may arise from these limitations are 
included. 
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2 CHANGE BLINDNESS 
2.1 Change Blindness Defined 
Change Blindness can be defined as individuals’ inability to detect changes that 
occur between views in their visual fields (Levin, 2002). Studies have shown that 
the change blindness phenomenon occurs in a broad variety of situations, ranging 
from the inability to detect a changed object (such as letters, numbers or pictures 
of objects) in a visual array of a few items (Pashler, 1988; Simons, 1996), delays 
in detecting changes in still photos that alternate between the original and a 
slightly changed image, at short intervals (Rensink, O’Regan & Clark, 1997), 
failure to detect between-view changes in motion pictures (Levin & Simons, 
1997) to the inability to detect between-view changes in real world situations 
(Simons & Levin, 1998; Levin, Simons, Angelone & Chabris, 2002).  
2.1.1 What is Change? 
Rensink (2002) emphasises the importance of identifying distinctions in the 
definition of change that not only guide designs of experiments in change 
blindness, but may also point to the different underlying neural processes involved 
in both change detection and the inability to detect certain changes. The first 
distinction is between change and motion. Change can be defined as the 
transformation of a well defined, enduring structure, while motion refers to a 
change of position over time. In other words, motion can be thought of as 
variation referenced to location, whereas change is referenced to structure. The 
second distinction involves distinguishing between change and difference. If 
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change, as defined above, refers to a single structure which undergoes some 
transformation over time, then difference refers to a lack of similarity in the 
properties of two structures (Rensink, 2002). Thus, in order to say that a change 
has been detected (or not detected), it is imperative that the phenomenological 
experience of the observer is that only a single structure, or single set of structures 
were involved. The third distinction is between detecting dynamic change, which 
involves seeing the change in progress, and detecting completed change, that is, 
seeing that something has changed. Watching a person unscrew and remove the 
lid of a jar, for example, is seeing dynamic change: the entire process of 
transformation from lidded to open jar is observed. Observing a closed jar on the 
counter top, leaving the kitchen, and returning later to find the same jar without its 
lid is an example of detecting completed change. 
As noted, these distinctions can help guide the design of change blindness 
experiments, as the design has to ensure that the detection of change is not the 
result of the detection of motion, nor is it phenomenologically perceived as the 
detection of difference by the subject. Decoupling change and motion, Rensink 
(2002) asserts, is achieved by making the change contingent on some event. 
Various contingencies of change can be employed and some are discussed in the 
following sections. This study employs a ‘cut-contingent’ method, which 
generally refers to motion pictures, and where the change is made during a cut 
from one camera angle to another. In this particular study, still images are 
employed as opposed to motion pictures, but the flowing narrative of the images 
and the alternating camera angles mimic those normally used in films, thus 
allowing the type of change used to be labelled cut-contingent change.  
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2.1.2 Change Blindness vs. Inattentional Blindness 
An important distinction worth highlighting is that between change blindness and 
inattentional blindness. Rensink (2000a) points out that change blindness (i) 
denotes the failure to report the presence of significant changes in the visual input 
under particular experimental conditions, (ii) concerns itself with transitions 
between quantities, as opposed to the simple presence of quantities, and (iii) 
pertains only to subjective visual experience (or qualia) as opposed to other 
aspects of seeing, such as visuomotor response or physiological response (for 
example, differential activity of various brain regions). In contrast, inattentional 
blindness pertains to not seeing the presence of an object/stimulus at any moment 
in time, and not necessarily the perception of change. An often quoted example of 
inattentional blindness is the ‘gorilla’ experiment conducted by Simons & Chabris 
(1999). Participants viewed a video where two small teams of people passed a 
basketball to one another. Participants were asked to mentally (silently) count the 
number of basketball passes that were made. In the middle of the video a woman 
dressed in a gorilla suit walked onto the scene, beat her chest and walked off. 
Participants were then asked a series of questions designed to determine whether 
they noticed this had occurred. Forty-six per cent of participants did not notice the 
unexpected event. 
  Although inattentional blindness may be found to occur with a changing 
stimulus input, the input does not need to be experienced as changing. The input 
can simply be experienced as different images shown in succession, without a 
‘history’ or narrative to connect them. Simply put, inattentional blindness refers to 
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the failure of perception of an input in the here and now, whereas change 
detection requires memory or comparison operations. This, Rensink (2000a) 
argues, shows that while these two phenomena may be related, there may be 
different mechanisms responsible for each.  
2.2 Change Blindness Experiments: Past and Present 
As early as the 1950s, researchers began developing an interest in change 
detection tasks and change blindness (Simons & Ambinder, 2005) with studies 
revealing people’s failure to detect changes to simple arrays of dots and letters 
when these were presented sequentially and separated by a brief blank interval. 
During the 1970s and 1980s this trend continued with research by Pashler (1988) 
for example, which demonstrated people’s inability to detect a changed object 
(letters, numbers or pictures of objects) in a visual array of a few items. In the 
1990s change blindness was further demonstrated in a series of experiments by 
Ron Rensink and his colleagues (Rensink, O’Regan & Clark, 1997). Some of 
these tasks were inspired by findings that changes introduced during eye 
movements often go undetected, referred to as saccade-contingent change 
blindness. Other tasks used still photos that alternated between the original and 
the slightly changed image at short intervals, such as photos of a jumbo jet which 
alternate between an image of the plane with an engine and without an engine. In 
such tasks participants showed significant delays in detecting the changes 
(Rensink et al., 1997). 
While it may not be very surprising that changes to unattended objects in the 
visual field may go undetected – most people are aware that so called ‘continuity 
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errors’ in films are often not noticed by the audience – it is interesting that the 
change blindness phenomenon extends to attended objects as well. Levin and 
Simons (1997) conducted a study where participants viewed a short video 
depicting an actor who heard a ringing phone and stood up to answer it. As the 
actor approached the phone, the camera angle changed and the actor was replaced 
with another actor. Two thirds of participants failed to notice the switch. 
The change blindness phenomenon was even demonstrated as taking place with 
attended objects in real-world scenarios. In the famous ‘door experiment’ by 
Simons and Levin (1998) an experimenter approached individuals on the campus 
of an American university and asked for directions to a building on the campus. 
While the participant was giving directions, two more experimenters carrying a 
door stepped between the first experimenter and the participant, and the first 
experimenter switched positions with one of the door-carriers who stayed behind 
to continue the conversation. About half of the participants did not notice that 
their conversation partner had changed. Simons and Levin (1998) admitted that 
part of this failure to detect the change may have been due to the fact that 
participants were concentrating on a task, giving directions, that involved looking 
at a map and/or at the direction of the building, and the fact that an unnatural 
disruption took place – the door-carrying experimenters chose to walk directly 
between two people who were clearly conversing. 
To address such concerns, Levin, Simons, Angelone and Chabris (2002) devised a 
study where the participants would not be distracted by a task while the change 
took place and the change would occur in a less disruptive and more natural way. 
    8
Individuals were asked to participate in a study and they approached a counter in a 
building behind which stood an experimenter who presented them with an 
informed consent sheet to sign. When participants returned the sheet to the 
experimenter, he crouched down behind the counter to “get them some forms”, 
and another experimenter stood up in the same place the first experimenter had 
crouched down. The second experimenter handed the participant a questionnaire 
designed to determine whether the switch was detected. Seventy five per cent of 
participants failed to detect the change. 
Such findings go against most people’s intuitive belief that they would be able to 
detect such changes (Levin, Momen, Drivdahl, & Simons, 2000; Levin, 2002). 
When a number of possible visual change scenarios were described to a group of 
psychology students, 90.5% of those questioned thought they would detect an 
actor’s changing scarf across shots in a video, 69.5% felt they would detect a 
change of actors across views in a video and 97.6% thought they would detect a 
change of conversation partner in a real-world scenario (Levin et al., 2000). These 
estimations exceed by far the change detection by participants in experiments. 
Levin (2002) refers to this intuitive inclination to think one would detect such 
changes as change blindness blindness. 
It also appears as though knowledge of the change blindness phenomenon, and 
specifically knowledge of person-change studies, has no impact on participants’ 
ability to detect a switch in conversation partners. In the counter experiment by 
Levin et al. (2002) described above, six of the participants recruited for the study 
had, less than one hour earlier, (unbeknownst to the experimenters) attended a 
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psychology seminar where the door study (Simons & Levin, 1998) had been 
described and discussed. Four out of the six still failed to detect the change. 
Despite their variations, what all the above-mentioned experiments have in 
common is that the change signals, or transients associated with change, are 
masked or otherwise impaired (Simons and Rensink, 2005). This is significant 
and is explored in further detail in the following section. 
2.3 Change Blindness Explained? 
Various possible explanations of the change blindness phenomenon have been put 
forward, and these often depend on the type of change detection task being 
explored. For example, in saccade-contingent change detection tasks, some 
explanations suggest that those mechanisms that generate a movement of the eyes 
actively suppress perception during the eye movement (Simons & Ambinder, 
2005), while other explanations refer to the observation that rapid movement of 
the eye produces a blur on the retina, and that this blurring may mask the change 
signal (Simons & Ambinder, 2005). Explanations pertaining to the type of change 
blindness experiments that are the focus of this study include the possibility that 
people fail to represent sufficient information about pre- and post-change objects 
or people (Levin et al., 2002), that people do form detailed representations of pre 
and post change objects or people, but are unable to access them consciously 
(Levin et al., 2002), or that representations are both effective and consciously 
accessible, but people simply fail to make cross-view comparisons and therefore 
fail to detect the changes (Levin et al., 2002; Mitroff, Simons, & Levin, 2004). 
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2.3.1 Visual Experience 
All the abovementioned experiments fuelled the idea that our visual experiences 
are not as richly detailed as we might assume. In fact, such findings led some 
theorists to assert that our visual world is in fact a ‘Grand Illusion’ (for example, 
Dennett, 1991 and Ballard, 2002). Noe (2002) attempts to summarise the grand 
illusion theory by saying that according to this theory our beliefs about what our 
perceptual experience is like are radically false, and that in fact our perceptual 
consciousness is a sort of confabulation. Clark (2002) extends this explanation of 
the grand illusion by expanding on what this confabulated consciousness consists 
of. Namely, that we experience a rich stream of highly detailed visual information 
covering an extensive part of our surroundings at any given moment in time. 
According to the theory, however, this is not the case. Our brains do not create 
such richly detailed models of visual scenes, so the ‘seemingness’ described 
above is an illusion. 
A number of theorists have suggested that, although some aspects of the notion of 
the grand illusion contain convincing kernels of truth, the grand illusion position 
is too extreme. The discussion now turns to arguments presented by three such 
theorists, Alva Noe, Andy Clark, and Arien Mack. Their positions are described, 
compared and contrasted, with specific reference to how these might shed light on 
the causes of change blindness. 
Noe (2002) suggests that the grand illusion theory emerged as a response to the 
more orthodox conception of experience which holds that it is understood that the 
sensory visual information we have access to via the eye is limited. This is based 
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on the observation that our visual input is made up of two tiny, distorted and 
upside-down retinal images, that our eyes have a foveal region that is relatively 
small, outside of which the retina is somewhat colour-blind, and that the eye is in 
nearly constant motion. The orthodox conception holds that despite these 
limitations, our brain is able to integrate all this sketchy information into a stable 
and detailed representation. However, work in perceptual psychology led to a 
rethinking of this orthodox conception, and the grand illusion theory was born. As 
an example of the new kind of thinking, Noe (2002) refers to Dennett’s (1991) 
discussion of the blind spot (the place on each retina where there are no 
photoreceptors). When looking at an image or scene or picture through only one 
eye, a part of this visual scene inevitably falls on the blind spot. So, in essence 
there is a gap in our visual experience. The fact that we don’t experience this gap 
as a gap – the fact that our visual experience appears to be continuous even though 
it is not – Dennett argues, shows that we are at the mercy of an illusion of visual 
consciousness. For a demonstration of the effect of the blind spot, see Figure  2-1 
below. Cover your right eye with your hand and focus your gaze on the smiley 
face. Hold the page approximately twenty centimetres from your face. The heart 
should disappear, as its image has been forced to fall on your blind spot. 
Figure  2-1: Blind Spot Demonstration 
               ♥                                                                          ☻   
Noe (2002) counters that while it is true that we do not experience the gap, it does 
not follow that we are under the illusion that we are experiencing the entire visual 
scene all at once. He gives the example of shutting one eye and looking at a wall. 
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Even though it seems to one that there is an unbroken expanse of wall, it does not 
seem as though one could experience the whole of the wall’s surface with a single 
fixation. Rather, the wall’s presence appears to be constant, but the details of the 
surface of the wall are accessed by looking at one bit of the wall or another. 
According to Noe (2002), we do not take our experiences to be as full as grand 
illusion theorists might suggest we do. It does however seem to us, Noe (2002) 
argues, that we have perceptual access to a world that is richly detailed and 
complete, because we do in fact have this access. This forms the basis of Noe’s 
sensorimotor approach to perception (O’Regan & Noe, 2001). 
The basis of this perceptual access, according to Noe (2002), is the possession of 
sensorimotor skills. These skills consist in the knowledge of how one relates, via 
the rules of sensorimotor dependence, to one’s immediate environment. So, 
returning to the question of change blindness, according to this sensorimotor skills 
theory, we know that we possess both the ability and the know-how to attend to 
particular aspects of a scene, at will. Change blindness results when we attend to a 
certain aspect, and therefore only see that aspect of the scene. But Noe (2002) 
argues that it does not stop there, since, phenomenologically speaking, we possess 
a perceptual awareness of some unattended aspects of the scene as well.  
This, too, Noe (2002) claims, can be accounted for by the sensorimotor skills 
theory, if one takes into account the notion of perceptual presence. Perceptual 
presence is illustrated using the example of a cat sitting behind a picket fence. One 
senses the presence of the cat (the whole cat) despite seeing only those parts of the 
cat not hidden behind the fence. This is not just a thought or inference that the 
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entire cat is present, but rather the perceptual experience that the cat is present.  
This is a form of amodal perception, that is, genuinely perceiving what is in fact 
out of view. This mode of perceiving results from two types of knowledge: the 
knowledge of what cats are like, and the (sensorimotor) knowledge that if you 
move your head or walk towards the cat, the parts previously hidden will come 
into view. 
In his discussion of a number of theories that arose, either in response to, or 
containing explanations for, the findings of work on change blindness and 
inattentional blindness, Clark (2002) addresses both the question of the grand 
illusion, and the senorimotor skills theory described above. Like Noe, Clark 
(2002) argues that the ‘seemingness’ of seeing is not the grand illusion that some 
theorists would have us believe. Clark (2002) commends the sensorimotor skills 
theory for successfully and elegantly dispelling the “miasma of Grand Illusion” 
(Clark, 2002, p. 194). He argues, however, that the theory developed by O’Regan 
and Noe (2001) ties the nature of conscious visual experience far too closely with 
specifically sensory engagement with the world, and terms this strong view 
‘Sensory Chauvinism’.  
Clark (2002) suggests a different way of unpacking the theory and its critique of 
the grand illusion argument. This entails placing less weight on the dependence of 
conscious experience on sensorimotor contingencies, and more weight on the role 
of semantic and episodic memory in conscious experience. In his discussion of the 
reasoning behind this argument, Clark (2002) refers to the work of Milner and 
Goodale (1998). Milner and Goodale’s (1998) claim is that, in the organisational 
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structure of the brain, there exist two structurally and functionally distinct kinds of 
vision: a visual system for action, and a visual system for perception. The former, 
which represents a much earlier evolutionary development, concerns the visually-
based control of fine motor action in the here and now, and is identified with the 
dorsal visual-processing stream which leads to the posterior parietal cortex, and 
the latter, a far more recent evolutionary development, concerns the knowledge 
and memory-based aspects of deliberate actions relating to semantics, planning 
and communication, and is identified with the ventral visual-processing stream 
which leads to the infero-temporal cortex.  
While Clark (2002) comments that Milner and Goodale’s discussion of the two 
visual streams perhaps overstates the extent to which these work in isolation from 
one another, and discusses a few slightly weakened accounts of the dual visual 
systems hypothesis, he does use it as a springboard for the argument that the link 
between consciousness and action involves memory systems just as much as it 
involves motor systems. Conscious experience, Clark (2002) argues, forms the 
base for reasoned action selection, and thus requires memory systems to mediate 
between sensory input and action.  
Simply put, O’Regan and Noe’s (2001) theory of sensorimotor skills pitches 
implicit knowledge of a set of possible actions and results at the level concerning 
head and eye movements and the possible resulting distortions of the retinal 
image, but Clark (2002) argues that in the case of conscious visual perception this 
implicit knowledge is pitched at the level of types of action and types of objects 
(that is, the semantic categorisation of these). It is the latter that appear to 
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underpin visual experience, Clark (2002) explains, as the errors demonstrated by 
phenomena such as change blindness help to show. It must be noted, however, 
that while the emphasis of the sensorimotor skills theory may be on sensorimotor 
contingencies, Noe (2002) still refers to the important role of semantic knowledge 
in conscious visual experience as mentioned in the cat behind a fence example 
above (that our perception of the semi-obscured cat depends on our understanding 
of cats, what they are and how they are). 
Mack (2002), like Noe and Clark, dismisses the grand illusion theory, suggesting 
that the real issue in question is not whether all that we think we see is an illusion, 
but rather, how much of what is before us do we see and why we have the 
phenomenological impression that we see it all. Mack (2002) points to the fact 
that the findings of explorations of change and inattentional blindness have 
highlighted the need for such questioning. Additionally, like Noe and Clark, Mack 
(2002) concedes that it appears that attention is needed in order to see and that we 
do not attend to everything all at once, therefore we cannot see everything all at 
once. The reason we get the sense that we see much of what there is to be seen, 
Mack (2002) argues, is because our attention is often broadly distributed, and not 
narrowly focused (as it is in inattentional blindness experiments of the sort 
described in the previous section). 
At this stage, Mack’s (2002) argument appears to fit in quite neatly with that of 
Noe (2002) and O’Regan and Noe (2001), in that we get a sense of seeing a large 
portion of what there is to be seen at any given moment because under normal 
circumstances our attention is distributed in such a way as to give us the gist of 
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the scene – and with it the impression that we processed the whole scene. Where 
these theorists begin to part ways is with Mack (2002) raising the problem of 
processing and storing information that we are not consciously aware of. Mack 
(2002) argues that O’Regan and Noe’s (2001) theory is not able to explain why it 
is that a lot of what we neither attend to nor see is still represented in memory 
(although it cannot be recalled consciously). Evidence supporting this comes from 
demonstrations of priming in change blindness and inattentional blindness 
experiments. Mack (2002) suggests that the reason we process and store 
unattended input is so that we can access its meaning and attend to it if necessary. 
To support this claim, Mack (2002) uses as an illustration the findings of Mack 
and Rock (1998, in Mack, 2002) in their analysis of inattentional blindness which 
shows that when attention is strongly focused on an aspect of a scene, the observer 
will be blind to everything else in the scene unless there is something present in 
the unattended aspects of the scene that is both very salient and meaningful which 
will capture attention and cause its detection. Interestingly, Mack (2002) points 
out that the stimuli most capable of achieving this include the observer’s own 
name and the iconic representation of a happy face. 
Taken together, the claims of these three theorists present a picture of visual 
experience that suggests: (i) that we are not subject to an illusion that we believe 
we see a full and richly detailed, snap-shot like picture of the world when in fact 
we do not, (ii) that we have perceptual access to an entire visual scene since we 
possess knowledge, in the form of sensorimotor skills, that can bring the various 
aspects of a scene into conscious awareness at will (Noe, 2002), (iii) that in 
addition to sensorimotor contingencies, we also have memory-based, semantic 
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knowledge of types of actions and types of knowledge that inform our visual 
consciousness (Clark, 2002), and (iv) that while our visual attention is mediated 
by both these forms of knowledge, we also process and encode unattended 
information, so that we may attend to it if we deem it both salient and meaningful 
enough. These descriptions of the nature of visual experience manage to explain 
both why change blindness occurs - we only see attended aspects of a scene and 
only attend to some aspects of a scene at once – while still allowing for the fact 
that we have the experience of seeing a lot more than we do. 
The discussion will now turn to the more specific role of attention and its 
mechanisms in the context of change blindness. This relationship is delineated 
explicitly by Rensink’s (2000b) coherence theory of focused attention. 
2.3.2 Coherence Theory 
Rensink, O’Regan and Clark (1997) assert that focused attention is needed to see 
change. Normally in real world situations, the argument goes; change is 
accompanied by a motion signal which will attract attention to the location of the 
change. If the motion signal is too weak, or some other factor interferes with or 
masks the motion signal (such as the eye saccades, photo flickers or motion 
picture cuts discussed above) insufficient attention will be drawn to the signal 
resulting in change blindness. This forms the basis of Rensink’s (2000b) 
coherence theory of focused attention. 
Within this theory, change blindness is understood to result from the masking or 
neutralisation of the motion signal which accompanies a particular change, which 
would otherwise draw attention to the location of the change (Rensink, 2000b). It 
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asserts that attention cannot integrate visual features into a detailed and long 
lasting coherent representation, but rather that a structure/object’s coherence lasts 
only as long as focused attention is directed towards it. Coherence in this sense 
refers to spatial and temporal consistency, that is, that representations at different 
spatial locations are understood to refer to the same object and that representations 
at different times are understood to refer to the same object. 
Rensink (2000b, 2001, 2002) breaks the theory down as follows: (i) Before 
attention is focused, structures known as proto-objects form rapidly and in parallel 
across the visual field, with limited spatial and temporal coherence. These 
structures are volatile and constantly regenerated, which means they are easily 
replaced by any new stimuli appearing in the same location on the retina. (ii) 
Focused attention is described as a metaphorical hand that grasps a few of these 
proto-objects, allowing them to be perceived as distinct objects with a high degree 
of spatial and temporal coherence. This coherence allows the object to retain its 
identity across interruptions, which means it is understood to transform into, as 
opposed to being replaced by, any new stimulus that arrives in the same retinal 
location. (iii) The moment focused attention is averted however, the object loses 
its coherence and reverts back to being a proto-object. 
If no more than a few coherent object representations can exist at any one time, 
one might ask how complex scenes can be represented and how it is that people 
generally have the impression of observing a large number of coherent objects 
simultaneously. Rensink (2000b, 2001, 2002) responds to such questions by 
asserting that instead of a detailed and coherent representation of all objects in a 
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scene being created, such representations are only created for those few objects 
needed for a given task. Whenever requested, attention will form a coherent 
representation of an object or any of its aspects, resulting in a ‘virtual 
representation’ of a scene that appears as if all objects have detailed and coherent 
representations simultaneously. 
The above discussion pertains mainly to the theoretical and philosophical 
discussions surrounding visual consciousness and perception, which may inform 
an understanding of the change blindness phenomenon at a more general, 
theoretical level. There have, however, been a number of empirical attempts to 
uncover and tease out, more specifically, the potential causes and underlying 
mechanisms of perception that may explain the occurrence of change blindness. 
The present study is conceived of as belonging to this latter category. 
2.3.3 Experimental Attempts to Uncover the Causes of Change Blindness 
Contemporary research includes a number of experiments that attempt to uncover 
some of the underlying causes of change blindness, such as a study by Levin, 
Simons, Angelone and Chabris (2002). The study replicated earlier door studies, 
but in addition to establishing levels of change detection, participants were also 
required to try and identify the pre-change experimenter from a photo line-up. 
Line-up accuracy was found to be poor for participants who failed to detect the 
change, but significantly greater and above chance for those participants that did 
notice the change.  
Noting that while this may serve as evidence supporting the possibility that the 
pre-change object was insufficiently represented, it does not rule out the 
    20
possibility that while information about the pre-change experimenter was 
sufficiently represented, it was then overwritten as a result of exposure to the post-
change experimenter. Levin, Simons, Angelone and Chabris (2002) included a 
further experiment to investigate this possibility. As before, some classic change 
blindness scenarios were carried out, but in this instance participants were asked 
to select both the pre- and post-change experimenters from photo line-ups. If 
overwriting had occurred, one would expect that participants would be better at 
selecting the second experimenter than at selecting the first. Results showed that 
this was not the case: identification frequencies of pre- and post-change 
experimenters were similar. 
A study by Mitroff, Simons, & Levin (2004) was conducted to strengthen the 
claim that change blindness can result from a failure to compare retained 
representations of both pre- and post-change objects. A series of experiments were 
set up where participants were shown an array of objects on a computer screen, 
which then disappeared and reappeared with one of the objects potentially 
replaced by a new one. In addition to reporting on whether or not they detected a 
change, participants were required to answer a series of two-alternative forced-
choice questions, where two objects were shown and the participants had to select 
the one they thought had been displayed in the trial. The questions included 
choices between the pre-change object and a novel object, the post-change object 
and a novel object, and an unchanged object and a novel object.  These three were 
presented in random order, and in trials where there was no change, all three 
questions included an unchanged object and a novel object. The experimenters 
reasoned that in cases where no change was detected, if participants were able to 
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pick out both the pre- and post-change objects at levels greater than chance, this 
would support the comparison failure hypothesis. Results did indicate that 
retained representations of pre- and post-change objects were present even under 
conditions of change blindness (Mitroff et al., 2004). They noted, however, that 
this does not mean that the representations formed were necessarily perfect or 
complete, but rather that they contained sufficient information to potentially 
support change detection. 
Similarly, a series of experiments by Varakin and Levin (2006) were carried out 
to test the relationship between change blindness and visual memory: specifically, 
whether good visual memory for stimuli can be demonstrated in the context of 
poor change detection. For example, participants viewed arrays of line drawn 
objects on a computer screen. A blank screen flicker appeared and the arrays were 
displayed again, with one of the objects potentially changed. Both before and after 
the screen flicker, all the objects in the array were cued in random order: each 
object was highlighted by two red bars appearing above and below it, in order to 
ensure that attention had been focused on both pre- and post-change objects. 
Following the post-flicker cuing sequence, forced choice change detection 
questions appeared on the screen. Participants responded ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the 
question of whether they had noticed any objects change and had to select the 
location on the screen where the change had taken place. These trials were 
followed by a surprise recognition test, where two versions of arrays that were 
used in the no-change trials were presented simultaneously on the screen, one of 
which contained one token-level substitution of an object. Participants had to 
select the array they had seen previously. For the tasks involving incidental (that 
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is, unexpected) change detection, change detection levels were equivalent to 
chance, whereas long term recognition levels were found to be above chance. This 
led Varakin and Levin (2006) to conclude that change blindness can be 
demonstrated in situations which lead to good visual memory. 
While it may seem contradictory that change blindness can occur even when we 
are able to form lasting visual representations, Varakin and Levin (2006) argue 
that it is important to distinguish between the visual system’s ability to store 
representations in memory and its tendency to use such representations to monitor 
visual information’s consistency over time. As Varakin and Levin (2006) put it: 
“it is important to distinguish between what people can do and what they 
generally do” (Varakin & Levin, 2006, p.52). Thus, while the capacity exists to 
retain a great deal of visual information and, depending upon the nature of the task 
or the intention of the observer, this capacity can be demonstrated, we do not 
necessarily utilise this capacity to detect changes to visual scenes. This conclusion 
seems to implicitly support the comparison failure hypothesis, since the results 
demonstrated good long term memory for both pre- and post- flicker arrays, and 
the researchers used visual cues in the form of highlighting objects within arrays 
to ensure that the changing objects would receive attention. One criticism of the 
Varakin and Levin (2006) study is that all the arrays used in the recognition tests 
were selected exclusively from the no-change trials. Although Varakin and Levin 
(2006) were careful to conclude that good memory for objects can be 
demonstrated in the same scenarios that lead to change blindness, as opposed to 
claiming that good memory can be demonstrated for pre- and post-change objects, 
it is possible that the good memory demonstrated for the arrays in the recognition 
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tests was the result of longer visual exposure, since in no-change trials the arrays 
were present on the screen twice as long as the pre- and post-flicker arrays in the 
trials where an object was changed. 
The various theories of visual experience described above (O’Regan & Noe, 2001, 
Noe, 2002, Clark, 2002, & Mack, 2002), Rensink’s (2000b) coherence theory, and 
the evidence from studies such as the one by Levin et al. (2002) – which were 
driven wholly, or in part, by the findings of the various change blindness 
experiments outlined in section 2.2 –  can be taken together to begin to form a 
better understanding of why the change blindness phenomenon occurs, and what 
this tells us about normal vision. 
The present study fits into the body of work relating to the empirical investigation 
of the possible explanations of change blindness, and could contribute to an 
understanding of the phenomenon in a number of ways. Firstly, at the simplest 
level, the findings of this study may re-demonstrate the change blindness 
phenomenon itself, thus contributing to the existing body of work that shows the 
robustness of this phenomenon. Secondly, it was noted above that there exists the 
general understanding that attention is needed in order to see change (Rensink, 
2000b, O’Regan & Noe, 2001, Noe, 2002, Clark, 2002, & Mack, 2002). What 
remains open to investigation, however, is what aspects of a particular scene are 
likely to draw attention in a change detection task. The present study aims to 
address this question empirically, via specific manipulation of selected 
experimental stimuli. It is hypothesised here that the more salient aspects of a 
visual scene will attract more attention, and as a result, just as coherence theory 
    24
suggests (Rensink, 2000b), changes to these aspects or parts will be more readily 
detected by observers. The choice of faces as an experimental stimulus (discussed 
in detail in the chapter that follows) is driven by this hypothesis, as it is reasoned 
that the face as a stimulus is particularly salient, and that the face’s constituent 
parts, that is its features, can be considered sensibly as unique and distinct parts, 
with some features being more salient than others. Finally, the findings yielded by 
the present study could go some way towards challenging the comparison failure 
hypothesis posited by Mitroff, et al. (2004). It is hypothesised here that some 
facial features, when altered, will be more likely to produce higher levels of 
change detection than others. If change blindness results from a failure to compare 
pre- and post-change objects, despite these objects being retained in memory, then 
levels of change detection should be similar regardless of which particular object 
(or part of the stimulus image) undergoes the change. 
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3 THE FACE AND ITS USE AS AN EXPERIMENTAL 
STIMULUS 
3.1 Nature of Stimuli in Past Change Blindness Experiments 
Before addressing the questions surrounding the choice of stimulus materials in 
the present study, it is important to take a closer look at the type of stimuli used in 
change blindness experiments in the past, and delineate some significant 
distinctions between these. The type of experimental stimuli used also produce 
different ‘types’ of change detection, and distinguishing between these can have 
important implications for one’s understanding of the underlying mechanisms and 
causes of change blindness. 
Table  3-1 shows a summary of a number of change blindness experiments and the 
resulting change detection rates of each. While the literature often groups these 
experiments as a collective body of work which demonstrates change blindness, 
some important distinctions need to be made. The first of these is the difference 
between what will be referred to here as changes that occur within a ‘narrative 
paradigm’ and changes that occur within a ‘flicker paradigm’. The narrative 
paradigm refers to changes occurring towards the end of a series of events that can 
be understood by the perceiver as a related, story-like narrative sequence. For 
example, giving directions to a person in the street, being interrupted by two 
people carrying a door who pass between you and your conversation partner, and 
then continuing the conversation once they have passed is a narrative sequence of 
events. The experiments by Levin and Simons (1997), Simons and Levin (1998),   
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Table  3-1: Summary of Selected Change Blindness Experiments and Detection Rates 
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    27
Levin et al. (2002) and Kadosh (2005) fit into the narrative paradigm. 
Alternatively, the flicker paradigm refers to changes to photographic or illustrated 
scenes that repeatedly alternate between an original image and a slightly changed 
variation, with gaps in between each alternation, used to mask the change 
transient. The alternating images do not form a story-like narrative sequence, but 
are simply the presentation of an image, then the image with a change, then the 
original image, and so on. Rensink et al.’s (1997) study fits into this paradigm.  
Another important difference that results from the different stimulus paradigms is 
what exactly is meant by change detection. In change blindness experiments 
belonging to the narrative paradigm, change detection generally refers to the 
number of participants that reported detecting the change. For example, in the 
door study by Simons and Levin (1998), about 47 per cent of participants reported 
noticing the person switch. On the other hand, within the flicker paradigm, change 
detection refers to the number of alternations required for a participant to 
accurately detect the change (i.e. to report that the change was noticed and to 
point out what had changed). Thus, the main difference is that within the flicker 
paradigm, change is always detected, and the question being asked is how long it 
will take for the change to be detected, whereas within the narrative paradigm, the 
question being asked is whether or not the change will be detected at all.  
A further, important distinction is that within the flicker paradigm, participants are 
informed that there will be a change, and actively search for this change. In the 
narrative paradigm, participants are naïve, that is, they do not know that a change 
is about to occur.  
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It is important to note that despite the differences between narrative and flicker 
paradigms discussed above, not all change blindness experiments fit neatly into 
one category or the other. In the experiments conducted by Mitroff et al. (2004), 
participants were neither involved in observing a narrative sequence of events, nor 
were they actively searching for change in flickering images. The experimental 
tasks involved viewing arrays of line-drawn objects, then a mask (a blank screen), 
then the same array with an object potentially changed. For every array there was 
a single pre- and post- change exposure, unlike the flicker tests where the images 
alternated until the change was detected. Thus, the nature of the stimulus was 
similar to those in the flicker paradigm (image – mask – altered image), but the 
operational definition of change was similar to those in the narrative paradigm 
(the question of whether change was detected was asked, as opposed to how long 
it took to detect change).    
It is important to draw distinctions between the various types of stimulus used in 
change blindness experiments because it is possible that different types of 
experiments reveal different facets of the underlying causes and mechanisms 
involved in change detection. In the flicker paradigm, for example, it is sensible to 
assume that delays in change detection result from failures relating to perceptual 
mechanisms, since the task does not necessarily call for a semantic or meaningful 
interpretation of the visual scene, but rather involves an active visual search for 
change of any kind. On the other hand, experiments relating to the narrative 
paradigm may demonstrate that change blindness results from the subordination 
of perceptual mechanisms to the semantic content of visual scenes and sequences. 
Returning again to the famous ‘door studies’ (Simons and Levin, 1998, Levin et 
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al., 2002), the participant may have detected that her conversation partner had 
changed at a perceptual level, but because she was not expecting such an unusual 
and far fetched event, and because experience in real world interaction had taught 
her that conversation partners usually remain stable for the duration of the 
conversation, she was unable to consciously access, and therefore remember and 
report, that the man standing before her at the end of the conversation was not the 
same person who had approached her to begin with. 
The present study addresses the operational and theoretical complexities relating 
to the nature of stimuli in change blindness tasks by using the same set of images 
(photographic images of faces) in two separate experiments, one designed to fit 
into the narrative paradigm, and one designed to fit into the flicker paradigm. It is 
reasoned that if the same set of images is used in two operationally distinct tasks, 
the possible effect of the particular experimental design on change detection can 
be teased out more sensibly, thus contributing to a more thoughtful consideration 
of the possible mechanisms underlying the change blindness phenomenon. The 
choice of faces as an experimental stimulus in the present study may also 
contribute toward this end, as discussed in the following section.       
3.2 Why Faces? 
Change blindness experiments involving a person as the object of change (e.g. 
Levin & Simons, 1997, Simons & Levin, 1998, Levin, Simons, Angelone & 
Chabris, 2002) marked a move from the simplistic stimuli often used in laboratory 
experiments, to more complex and naturalistic stimuli, the likes of which are more 
likely to be encountered in real world situations. This is significant as it supports 
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the view that change blindness is not an experimental artefact produced by 
artificial disruptions but rather a genuine and general failure to either retain and/or 
compare visual information from one moment to the next (Simons and Rensink, 
2005). 
In addition to this, the role of attention in change detection can be more 
thoroughly explored in experimental scenarios where the object of change will be 
more likely to receive preferential attention. It is perhaps not very surprising, at 
least intuitively, that unattended objects or events may go unnoticed. But when 
attending to visual scenes or images, it is more surprising that changes to the 
scene or image might not be noticed. When asking the question of what aspects of 
attended visual objects go unnoticed, one might uncover clues pertaining to facets 
of visual perception such as encoding and visual comparisons. Using people as the 
changing input stimulus can go some way towards guaranteeing that the stimulus 
will receive attention, since attention is normally drawn to semantically central 
items (Rensink, O’Regan, & Clark, 1997). More specifically, in images involving 
people, faces are found to be of particular interest, and draw a lot of attention. 
Studies involving the scanning of eye movements show that people tend to fixate 
on faces when viewing images containing people, objects and scenery 
(Kanwisher, 2001). 
The emphasis on faces in this study is further driven by the observation that in a 
large number of change blindness experiments, particularly those involving the 
flicker paradigm (e.g. Rensink et al., 1997) the visual stimuli often contain 
changes to objects of marginal interest. That is, objects that when changed, have 
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little effect on the semantic interpretation of the entire image, and changes to 
objects in very ‘busy’ images – in other words images that contain a large number 
of objects and details. Rensink et al. (1997) pointed out that when the change 
occurs in an object of central interest, the change is detected far more rapidly than 
for an object of marginal interest. For example, when an image of a man and 
woman dining was used – containing a change where the railing behind them was 
shifted further up to a new location – an average of 16.2 alternations was required 
to identify the change. However, when an image of a cock-pit windscreen 
overlooking a helicopter flying outside was used – containing a change where the 
location of the helicopter was altered – an average of only 4.0 alternations was 
required to identify the change. The centrality or marginality of objects in the 
photographs was determined by asking five naïve observers to provide a brief 
verbal description of the scene. Objects of central interest were defined as those 
parts of the image which were mentioned by three or more observers and objects 
of marginal interest were defined as those mentioned by none (Rensink et al., 
1997). This demonstrates the importance of centrality as opposed to marginality 
of the change in change detection. However, it fails to address the issue of the 
semantic importance of the changing object in the meaningful interpretation of the 
image, and the relative ‘busyness’ or sparseness of details in the image and how 
these may affect change detection. 
This study may go some way towards addressing questions regarding the effect of 
the types of stimuli used in change blindness experiments, since the stimulus 
materials used in this study can be contrasted with stimuli used in experiments 
such as the one discussed above (Rensink et al., 1997) – the images used in this 
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study are sparse and uncluttered, with a single object in the foreground – while 
still being similar enough at the level of experimental methods to allow for 
meaningful comparisons. 
3.2.1 Faces vs. Objects: Possible Implications of Different Processing 
Mechanisms 
Given that the change blindness phenomenon has been demonstrated in both 
scenarios involving changing objects and changing people, and that this study 
involves faces as the changing stimulus, it is important to point out any possible 
differences in the processing mechanisms which lead to the recognition of objects 
and faces under normal circumstances. 
How we perceive, recognize and remember faces has been the topic of much and 
varied research. Currently, holistic and configural processing of faces appears to 
be the dominant view (Bartlett, Searcy, & Abdi, 2003). This view holds that 
individual facial features, especially of upright faces, are not encoded 
independently of each other, but rather that the processing of faces involves the 
encoding of interfeatural relations and also interactive encoding across broad 
regions of a face (Bartlett et al., 2003). Even before one explores the experimental 
data which supports this view, it is intuitively sensible. After all, faces in nature 
exist in their entirety: one is rarely, if ever, faced with the task of recognizing a 
neighbour’s eyes without having the neighbour’s whole face present. 
Tanaka and Farah (2003) argue that because all human faces share the same basic 
features which are arranged in the same basic configuration, recognition, 
identification and the ability to distinguish between particular faces must rely on a 
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very detailed analysis of both the face’s featural and configural information. They 
describe research where face components such as eyes, noses and mouths were 
better recognised as belonging to a particular face when they were presented 
within the context of the whole face than when they were presented in isolation. 
This was not the case, however, when the component parts used belonged to non-
face objects, scrambled faces or inverted faces. 
On the other hand, object recognition is generally thought to be achieved using 
part-based processing. Some examples of theories that posit that objects are 
recognised on the basis of the nature and location of their parts include 
Biederman’s (1987, in Bruce and Humphreys, 1994) theory, that asserts that 
objects are perceived as being comprised of a limited set of volumetric shapes 
named ‘geons’. Recognition of objects is based on the particular relationship 
between these geons. Biederman (1987, in Bruce and Humphreys, 1994) showed 
that when individuals were presented with line drawings of objects which had 
parts of their contours removed, recognition of the object was more accurate when 
the deleted contours maintained the underlying part structures than when they 
destroyed the part structures. 
There also appears to be neuroanatomical evidence for the separate processing of 
objects and faces. In the case of neurological impairments, the dissociation of 
deficits in object processing, known as agnosia, and face processing, known as 
prosopagnosia, seems to suggest separate neurological processing for faces and 
objects (Bruce and Humphreys, 1994). 
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Although such evidence seems to suggest different mechanisms for the 
recognition of faces and objects, Tanaka and Farah, (2003) suggest that perhaps 
face recognition may not be that distinct from object recognition, and that the 
holistic processing most often attributed to faces may also be employed for other 
stimuli, particularly by ‘experts’ whose knowledge of particular objects or animals 
is quite extensive. Human beings, the argument goes, are experts at facial 
recognition, since faces are arguably the most important visual stimulus we 
encounter. If one possesses a certain degree of expertise in the recognition of non-
face objects, Tanaka and Farah (2003) hypothesised, then the type of processing 
used in the recognition of such an object might be similar to the face recognition 
processes. They refer to a study in which participants were trained to become 
experts at the recognition of artificial objects termed ‘Greebles’, which, like faces, 
all had the same basic features arranged in a canonical configuration. The experts 
were found to be faster than non-experts at recognising Greeble parts when these 
were shown in an original configuration than when they were shown in a new 
configuration, indicating that objects other than faces make use of holistic 
recognition mechanisms. 
With facial stimuli being the focus of this study, and given the discussion above 
which points to the possibility of different processing mechanisms for the 
recognition of objects and faces, it is important to note that the findings of this 
study may not be directly applicable to the role of objects within the change 
blindness phenomenon. 
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3.3 Should facial features be considered in isolation? 
The discussion above referred to the generally accepted understanding that faces 
are recognised and processed holistically or configurally. Given this, can facial 
features be sensibly considered in isolation, as in this study? Evidence from 
experiments involving memory conjunction errors and inversion effects shows 
that featural (or piecemeal) information plays a unique role in facial recognition, 
prompting Bartlett et al. (2003) to suggest dual-route hypothesis of face 
recognition and perception. 
Facial inversion studies have shown that inversion affects the processing of 
features less than the processing of configural information (for example spatial 
relations between features). A study by Freire, Lee and Symons (2000) showed 
that participants’ accuracy levels for detecting spatial differences among faces 
were significantly lower when faces were presented inverted than when presenting 
upright faces, but when the differences were featural, the accuracy of detection 
was unaffected by inversion. A series of experiments by Searcy and Bartlett 
(1996) showed similar findings. Examining the perceived grotesqueness of faces 
that had been altered either spatially/configurally (for example moving features 
farther apart or closer together) or distorted at the feature level (for example 
blackening some teeth), they found that while the perceived grotesqueness of the 
former was significantly reduced by inversion, inversion did not reduce the 
perceived grotesqueness of the featurally altered faces. Searcy and Bartlett (1996) 
also showed that speed of detection in face-matching studies is slowed less by 
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inversion of faces with featural differences than by inversion of faces with spatial 
differences. 
Such evidence would seem to suggest a qualitatively different process for 
recognizing and perceiving facial features than for processing spatial-relational 
information. This is further supported by findings from studies demonstrating 
memory conjunction errors. These errors are a phenomenon that occurs when 
people combine parts of separately perceived experiences and ‘remember’, 
falsely, a conjunction that does not correspond to a single previously experienced 
event (Reinitz, Lammers, & Cochran, 1992). Reinitz, Lammers, and Cochran 
(1992) conducted an experiment where participants were shown a series of faces, 
first in a study condition, then in a test condition. In the test condition participants 
were required to respond “yes” or “no” depending on whether they thought they 
had seen the face before, during the study condition. The tested faces were either 
‘old’ faces, that is faces shown during the study condition, ‘conjunction’ faces, 
made up of combining the hair and mouth of one studied face with the eyes and 
nose of another, or entirely new faces that had not been seen in the study 
condition. Conjunction faces produced many false alarms, with participants 
responding that they had seen the face before, leading Reintiz et al. (1992) to 
conclude that featural information is encoded and retrieved more readily than 
configural information. Other studies yielded similar findings (for example 
Searcy, Bartlett, & Memon, 1999). McKone and Peh (2006) summarize the logic 
of memory conjunction experiments as follows: 
If performance is based entirely on matching the whole studied item (e.g. 
because no part decomposition takes place in either perception or memory), the 
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pattern old>conjunction=new will be obtained. Alternatively, if performance is 
based purely on part matches (e.g., because there is no binding of parts into 
wholes), the pattern will be old=conjunction>new.                                            
McKone and Peh (2006) argue, however, that the high levels of false alarm rates 
for conjunction faces in studies such as the one described above may have been 
influenced by a number of other factors. The first is that these studies employed as 
their stimuli schematic line drawings that showed ‘unnatural’ representations of 
faces, possibly causing participants to pay more attention to parts. The second is 
that in studies which used real photographs, the photographs included hair, 
considered to be a particularly salient recognition cue (discussed further below). 
To overcome such effects, McKone and Peh (2006) conducted a memory 
conjunction experiment using natural-appearing composite photographs with no 
hair, with conjunction stimuli made entirely of internal facial features: combining 
the eyes and eyebrows region of one face with the nose and mouth region of 
another (these feature combinations were chosen based on results of free scanning 
tasks which show that subjects generally fixate more on the eye region than either 
the nose or mouth – such findings are briefly discussed below). Results showed 
that conjunction faces were judged as old some of the time, producing the pattern 
old>conjunction>new. McKone and Peh (2006) concluded that these results 
demonstrate that configural or holistic processing does take place for upright 
faces, which explains the higher levels of recognition responses to the ‘old’ 
condition, but also that the results indicate memory for local feature sets, shown 
by the higher levels of recognition responses to conjunctions than to new faces. 
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The above discussion shows that as Bartlett et al. (2003) suggested, both 
configural/holistic processing and piecemeal processing appear to play a role in 
facial recognition, that there is experimental evidence supporting the claim that 
facial features can be unique units of perception at the level of encoding and/or 
retrieval, and that featural information plays an important role in long term 
memory tasks. 
3.4 Salience of facial features in recognition and memory tasks 
Shepherd, Davies, and Ellis (1981) discuss various experiments which suggest 
that particular attributes or elements of the face as a stimulus seem to be more 
critical for identification purposes than others. They divide these experiments into 
different groups such as studies relying upon subjective reports or verbal 
descriptions, experiments investigating participants’ ability to detect changes in 
facial cues and how such changes might affect recognition of faces, and 
experiments investigating participants’ eye movements while examining faces. 
Results across the various types of studies, according to Shepherd et al. (1981), 
were not always homogeneous or consistent. Studies which employed the method 
of asking participants to report which cues they felt were important in recognizing 
a face showed that eyes and facial structure were listed as most subjectively 
salient, while the hair and mouth and chin regions were considered less salient. 
Studies which used a method of asking participants to describe a face (either from 
memory or from a present stimulus) found that the features most frequently 
mentioned, in descending order, were hair, eyes, nose, face structure, eyebrows, 
chin, lips, and others. Studies into the eye movements of participants (while 
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examining a face) generally showed that people spent more time fixating their 
gaze on the central features of the face, namely nose, eyes and mouth, and less 
time on peripheral features such as hair (for example Stacey, Walker & 
Underwood, 2005). 
Perhaps most relevant to this study are those experiments discussed by Shepherd 
et al. (1981) which measured the effect of distorting or altering certain features of 
a face in face recognition tasks. These experiments varied in their methods, with 
some having participants make same/different judgements on simultaneously 
presented pairs of faces constructed from forensic Identikit tools and measuring 
reaction times involved, while others had participants make same/different 
judgements on successively presented pairs of faces constructed from Photofit 
composites (for example Davies, Ellis & Shepherd, 1977). The various 
experiments did not always produce consistent results: the simultaneous, Identikit 
studies showed changes to the hair, eyes, and chin region to be most salient, with 
nose and mouth changes showing slower reactions, whilst the successive Photofit 
studies showed that while hair changes were most rapidly detected, eyes, nose and 
mouth regions showed more rapid detection than changes to the chin. 
Despite the seemingly inconsistent salience data derived from the various studies 
involving facial recognition tasks, there do appear to be some overarching trends, 
according to Shepherd et al. (1981). Firstly, hair emerged as the most important, 
and by inference salient, single feature in the majority of the studies of cue 
salience. Secondly, all studies that posed the questions, “What parts of the face are 
most important for allowing an individual to identify a face as one s/he has seen 
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before?” or “What parts of the face are most important in judging two faces to be 
similar or different?” found that some features had a more significant role to play 
than others. 
Taken together with the evidence marshalled above which demonstrates the 
important role of features in visual processing and memory tasks involving faces, 
such findings may contribute to investigations into the phenomenon of change 
blindness, specifically those change detection tasks involving people as the object 
of change. The above findings are used in the present study as a guide, in order to 
construct an experiment where changes are made to selected aspects of a face, and 
it is expected that some of these changes are more salient than others. The aim of 
the study is then to test whether the more salient changes produce higher levels of 
change detection. The findings yielded by the present study could contribute to the 
understanding of change blindness in a number of ways. First, they may begin to 
answer the question posed above about what draws attention to some scene 
elements and not others in a change detection task. Second, they may provide 
evidence against the hypothesis that change blindness results from a failure to 
make between-view comparisons. Third, if this study yields findings which 
demonstrate that feature salience plays a role in change detection/blindness; this 
may provide a motivation for the investigation of cue salience in change detection 
tasks involving stimuli other than faces. 
In addition, deepening our understanding of the change blindness phenomenon 
could have a number of applications in ‘real world’ settings. For example, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, change blindness tends to occur when the 
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motion signal which normally accompanies change is masked or disrupted. For a 
number of ‘real world’ activities that require sensitive visual alertness and 
vigilance, such as driving, attending to closed-circuit television security images, 
or radar observation, a more thorough understanding of the processes involved in 
change detection and its ‘pitfalls’ could influence the way in which such activities 
are carried out, as well as informing technological and ergonomic development in 
such fields.  
More specifically, the focus on faces and people in the context of change 
blindness could also have important ‘real world’ relevance. In Kadosh’s (2005) 
research investigating the effect of race in a change blindness experiment 
involving a person as the object of change, it was found that individuals were less 
likely to detect a change involving an actor switch in a motion picture if the actor 
pair were of a different race than the observer, and the implications of this for 
cross-race eyewitness identification were pointed out. Similarly, the effects of 
isolated facial feature transformations and change blindness could also contribute 
to our understanding of eye-witness testimony and its associated applications, 
since isolated facial features are often used in the construction of suspect 
composites, and feature-based retrieval techniques are used in order to narrow 
down the number of offender photographs shown to potential witnesses during 
criminal investigations (Lee, Whalen, Sakalauskas, & Baigent, 2004).  
While eye-witness identification tasks are often quite different from change 
detection tasks like the ones employed in change blindness experiments, the 
potential relationship between change detection and eyewitness identification was 
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illustrated using a hypothetical scenario in Kadosh’s (2005) discussion. Imagine 
an old man sitting on a park bench reading a newspaper, when a young man 
sitting on the adjacent bench moves closer and asks him for the time. The old man 
responds with the time and goes back to reading his newspaper, until he decides to 
go get a cup of tea from a nearby kiosk. Before he gets up he reaches into his 
jacket pocket where he knows he should find some money, but he finds none, and, 
knowing that the money was present in his pocket when he first sat on the bench, 
he turns to the man on the adjacent bench and accuses him of picking his pocket 
when he came closer to ask for the time. Of course, the man on the bench would 
be a little confused because he had never asked the old man for the time; he sat 
down on the bench moments earlier when the other young man who had been 
sitting on it got up and left. This is a very unlikely scenario but it does 
demonstrate the possibility of failure of change detection in a real-life situation 
with relevance to eyewitness identification.    
    43
4 THE PRESENT STUDY: MOTIVATION AND AIMS 
4.1 Research Rationale 
The change blindness phenomenon has been the topic of a great deal of research 
in recent years (Pashler, 1988; Simons, 1996; Rensink, O’Regan, & Clark, 1997; 
Levin & Simons, 1997; Simons & Levin, 1998; Levin, Momen, Drivdahl, & 
Simons, 2000; Levin, Simons, Angelone, & Chabris, 2002; Mitroff, Simons, & 
Levin, 2004). While results yielded by such investigations seem to have important 
implications in areas such as visual perception and attention, with the change 
blindness literature converging on a relatively homogeneous set of findings, some 
questions remain open to investigation.  
For example, it has not been clearly established what draws attention to some 
scene elements in a change detection task and not others. As discussed in the 
previous chapters, change blindness experiments which utilise more naturalistic 
scenes, such as photographs, as their visual stimuli are often fairly ‘busy’ images 
containing a large number of visual items, or contain changes to semantically or 
physically marginal items. This study utilises visual stimuli where the changing 
object is central to the scene, both in terms of meaning, and physically, with few 
other visual distracters present. This could not only help to test the robustness of 
the change blindness phenomenon in general, but could go some way towards 
uncovering which elements of a visual scene are most salient and thus less likely, 
when changed, to result in the failure of an observer to detect the change. Faces 
are a logical choice as stimulus material as they have already been found to 
receive preferential visual attention, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
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Furthermore, while a number of experiments have been designed to try and 
determine the cognitive processes which may be responsible for change blindness, 
these have not always yielded consistent findings, and the issue remains open to 
the possibility of further investigation. The previous chapters included a 
discussion of the comparison-failure hypothesis, and it was noted that this study’s 
findings, if consistent with its hypothesis that some facial features are more salient 
and therefore more likely to elicit change detection, could go some way towards 
challenging the comparison-failure hypothesis. This forms a secondary motivation 
for the present study. 
In short, by incorporating findings from the study of the salience of facial features 
in facial recognition tasks into a change blindness experiment, this study hopes to 
further the understanding of what aspects of a visual scene are most important in 
the context of a change detection task, and what such findings may reveal about 
the cognitive mechanisms underlying such change detection (or lack of detection). 
4.2 Research Aims 
The study investigated the effect of facial feature salience on the change blindness 
phenomenon in a change detection task involving a person as the object of 
change. The study utilised two experimental paradigms. The first was the 
narrative paradigm, where participants looked at a short photo-story, comprised of 
a few still frames, depicting individuals engaging in an everyday activity. In the 
final frame, a selected facial feature of a character in the story was altered. Four 
different photo-stories were used, each utilising a different alteration. A short 
questionnaire designed to determine whether the change was detected was 
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administered. The second was the flicker paradigm, where a flicker test was 
carried out using three sets of alternating photograph pairs. Participants watched 
the continuously alternating photographs on a screen and were timed to determine 
how long it took them to spot the difference between the photographs.  
4.3 Research Questions 
1. What levels of change detection will result from experiments 1 and 2, and 
how do these findings compare to similar studies utilising narrative and 
flicker paradigms in change detection tasks? 
2. Will particular facial features, when altered, produce higher rates of 
change detection than others in change blindness experiments involving a 
person as the object of change? 
3. What are the implications of the findings for questions 1 and 2 for an 
understanding of the change blindness phenomenon and its underlying 
mechanisms? 
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5 METHODS 
5.1 Experiment 1: The Photo Story 
5.1.1 Design  
The design of this study was pre-experimental: there was manipulation of the 
independent variable, but no control groups or random assignment. The dependent 
measure was the number of people who failed to notice the change in the photo 
story. 
It is important to note here, however, that while there was no control group per se 
– the nature of the experiment is such that there could be no sensible absence 
condition – a theoretical baseline condition was used. The different person (DP) 
condition was selected as a baseline since it was reasonable to expect that people 
would notice a change to the entire object. More specifically, it was reasoned that 
if people were to notice a change to part of an image, they would certainly notice 
a change to the entire image.  
Given the aim of the study; to determine whether some facial features, when 
changed, produce higher rates of change detection, this design, while pre-
experimental, could allow the researcher to touch on causality but relative to a 
baseline that is not an absence condition. 
 
 
    47
5.1.2 Sample 
The sample consisted of Wits University students (N= 301) with ages ranging 
from 15 to 50 years (mean age = 20.14 years, standard deviation = 2.968). Table 
 5-1 shows a break-down of some demographic characteristics of the sample. 
Ninety participants (n=90) were tested on the different face condition, seventy-
one participants (n=71) were tested on the different hair condition, sixty-nine 
participants (n=69) were tested on the different eyes and eyebrows condition, and 
seventy-one (n=71) participants were tested on the different nose and mouth 
condition. Table  5-2 shows a break-down of experimental condition by gender. 
 
Table  5-1: Demographic Characteristics of Sample: Age by Gender 
AGE FEMALE MALE TOTAL 
15 – 19 76 75 151 
20 – 24 87 52 139 
25 – 29 1 6 7 
30 + 2 - 2 
Unknown 1 1 2 
TOTAL 167 134 301 
 
A non-probability sampling technique was employed to recruit participants. All 
301 participants volunteered to take part in the study, and were selected on the 
basis of convenience. This is discussed in more detail in the procedure section 
below. 
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Table  5-2: Sample: Experimental Condition by Gender 
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION FEMALE MALE TOTAL 
Different Person 58 32 90 
Different Hair 31 40 71 
Different Eyes & Eyebrows 29 40 69 
Different Nose & Mouth 48 23 71 
TOTAL 166 135 301 
 
5.1.3 Instruments 
Four short photo-stories or photo-comics were created for the purposes of the 
study. Each depicted a person engaging in an everyday activity, and was 
comprised of 7 still frames, creating a narrative sequence. All four photo stories 
were identical in every respect except that in the last frame an alteration was made 
to the appearance of the main character in the photo-story. The alterations fell into 
four categories: (i) the actor in the photo-story was replaced by a different actor 
altogether, (ii) the shape and colour of the hair was changed, (iii) the shape and 
colour of the eyes and eyebrows was altered, and (iv) the nose and mouth were 
changed. Photo-manipulation software was employed to achieve the effects in 
conditions 2-4. Figure  5-1 shows the original image and the four alternative 
images used in the photo-stories. 
The photo story was presented one frame at a time, in sequence, with the exposure 
for each frame lasting between 3-6 seconds. The images were accompanied by an 
audio narrative which, coupled with the images, ensured the creation of a 
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narrative flow which made it clear that the person in the final frame, the altered 
frame, was expected to be the same character seen in previous frames in the story. 
A single voice was used to narrate all the parts in the photo story. For a copy of 
the entire photo story and accompanying narrative please see Appendix A. 
 
 
Figure  5-1: Photo story images 
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As an experimental stimulus, this photo story compares to the type of stimulus 
materials used in change blindness experiments that fit into the narrative 
paradigm, as discussed in the literature review, and introduces change in a 
surprising and unexpected way. Just as one would not expect one’s conversation 
partner to change into a different person mid-way through an interaction (Simons 
and Levin, 1998, Levin et al., 2002), one would not expect a photo story 
character’s hair to change from red to black from one moment to the next. Unlike 
previous studies, however, which used either real world interaction or motion 
pictures where a person was the object of change, the instruments here are 
constructed using photographic images. This may reduce the realism of the 
instruments to some degree, but it is worth noting that photographic images 
represent a more naturalistic stimulus than line drawings or illustrations (for 
example as used in experiments by Mitroff et al., 2004).  
Since in real world interactions the assumption is that a person would be looking 
directly at the person with whom one is interacting – which is imperative in the 
investigation of change blindness, as the concept of change blindness refers to 
looking at but not noticing change – it was important to ensure that participants 
were actively looking at the images in the photo story, and they were verbally 
instructed to do so before the experiment began. This helped ensure that if an 
observer failed to report the change, this was not due to not having watched the 
photo story.  
A questionnaire was also used in the study. The questionnaire comprised of two 
parts, the first containing demographic questions to record the participants’ age 
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and gender, the second containing questions designed to determine whether the 
change in the photo story was detected. No identifying information was included 
in the demographic questionnaire, so as to maintain the anonymity of the 
participants.  
The question of change detection was not addressed directly. In other words, 
participants were not asked “Did you notice that in the last frame the main 
character’s hair changed colour?” for example. Instead, questions were similar to 
questions used in previous change blindness studies (Levin et al., 2002) so as to 
allow for more honest responses. Participants were first asked to describe the 
events in the photo story as they remembered them, and were allowed space for an 
open response. The second question asked participants whether they noticed 
anything unusual in the photo story with closed-ended Yes/No selections followed 
by an open-ended, “If yes, please specify” section. The inclusion of the first 
question was based on the reasoning that if a given participant did notice the 
change, but perhaps did not consider this to be particularly unusual; s/he may have 
described the change in answering the first question, but not in the second one. 
These questions were the same as the ones used in Levin et al.’s (2002) 
experiments involving person changes during real world interactions. The 
questionnaire took between 3 and 7 minutes to complete, depending upon how 
much detail participants chose to include in their responses. A copy of the 
questionnaire can be found in Appendix B. 
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Given the relative simplicity of the concept of change blindness, and its proven 
robustness in previous studies on which the present study was operationally 
modelled, it is sensible to assume the reliability and validity of the instruments. 
5.1.4 Procedure 
Data collection took place over several days, and the experiment was conducted in 
one of two variations. In the first variation, large groups of students (for example 
an entire lecture audience/class) were addressed en masse at various lecture 
theatres on campus at the University of the Witwatersrand, with the experimenter 
asking for their participation in the study. The students were informed, both 
verbally and in writing, that participation was purely voluntary and that electing to 
participate or not would neither advantage nor disadvantage any person in any 
way (academically or otherwise). Students were also briefly informed of what 
participation would entail, in terms of the type of tasks involved and the time it 
would take to complete the tasks. Those electing to participate signed an informed 
consent form and remained at the venue to take part in the experiment which 
immediately followed. 
Volunteers were issued a series of verbal instructions by the experimenter. They 
were asked to pay close attention to the images in the photo story, and not to 
discuss the photo story or their responses in the questionnaire until the experiment 
was completed and all questionnaires collected. The photo story was then 
projected onto a large screen at the front of the lecture hall, accompanied by audio 
narration. The questionnaires were then administered, volunteers completed the 
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questionnaires, and these were collected by the experimenter. A debriefing session 
followed where the nature of the experiment was described to the participants. 
The second variation of data collection was similar to the first in every respect 
except that potential participants were approached in much smaller groups 
(between 1 and 6 individuals) at various locations on campus, and watched the 
photo story on a smaller computer screen. 
It is important to note that any one given participant only watched one 
variation/condition of the photo story. 
5.1.5 Analysis 
Descriptive statistics were used to answer question one. The levels of change 
detection were determined using frequencies, that is the number of people who 
reported noticing, or failed to notice, the change. This form of descriptive 
statistics is the same as those used in similar change blindness experiments (for 
example Simons and Levin, 1998), and so can be easily used as the basis for 
qualitative comparison to other studies. 
A logistic regression analysis was employed in experiment one in order to test the 
relationship between the various experimental conditions, that is which photo 
story any given participant watched, and the likelihood of detecting the change. 
Logistic regression, which is a regression model, is appropriate for this analysis, 
firstly, as the research question being posed here is merely one of association, and 
secondly, as the dependent variable involved in the analysis is nominal. Statistical 
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tests of the effects of other variables in the study, such as gender and age, on 
change detection were also included. 
5.2 Experiment 2: The Flicker Test 
5.2.1 Design  
The design of this study was pre-experimental: there was manipulation of the 
independent variable, but no control groups or random assignment. The dependent 
measure was the number of alternations taken to detect the change. 
As in experiment one, there was no sensible absence condition that could be used 
as a control, but the theoretical baseline (purely theoretical in this instance, while 
experiment one had a theoretical and operational baseline) is the reasoning that a 
change to the entire image would be noticed immediately. Thus, while the design 
is pre-experimental, the question of causality can be touched on relative to this 
theoretical baseline. 
The aim of this experiment, as in experiment one, is to determine whether some 
facial features when changed produce higher rates of change detection. But in this 
case the logic of change detection is slightly different as this experiment fits into 
the flicker paradigm, so change detection refers to how long it takes an observer to 
notice the change, and not whether or not the change was noticed. 
5.2.2 Sample 
A sample consisting of 75 students from the University of the Witwatersrand was 
used in this experiment, 40 females and 35 males. Twenty-five participants (n=25) 
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were tested in the different hair condition, twenty-five (n=25) in the different eyes 
and eyebrows condition, and twenty-five (n=25) in the different nose and mouth 
condition. Table  5-3 shows a break-down of the sample in terms of experimental 
condition and gender. 
Table  5-3: Sample: Experimental Condition by Gender 
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION FEMALE MALE TOTAL 
Different Hair 13 12 25 
Different Eyes & Eyebrows 12 13 25 
Different Nose & Mouth 12 13 25 
TOTAL 37 38 75 
 
A non-probability sampling technique was employed to recruit participants. All 
75 participants volunteered to take part in the study, and were selected on the 
basis of convenience. 
5.2.3 Instruments 
A simple computer programme was created for the purpose of this study. 
Photographic images on a computer screen, alternating between the original (A) 
and a changed variation (A’) were presented at an exposure rate of 1000ms, with a 
blank grey screen being presented in between at an exposure rate of 100ms (this is 
represented graphically in Figure  5-2). The purpose of the blank grey screen is to 
mask the change transient, which, as noted in the literature review, is always 
masked or otherwise interrupted in change blindness experiments, as the motion 
signal associated with the change transient instantly draws attention to the location 
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of change. This cycle continues until a button is pressed. The number of 
alternations is recorded by the programme, counting from the first appearance of 
the altered variation up to and including the photographic image which appears at 
the time the button is pressed. This programme was used with three different 
image conditions, pictured in Figure  5-3. 
 
 
Figure  5-2: Flicker test cycle 
The design of this experimental stimulus was modelled on the flicker tests 
conducted by Rensink et al. (1997). The verbal instructions for taking part in the 
flicker test were also like the ones used in the Rensink experiments, and are 
detailed in the following section. The similarity of the instruments to those used in 
previous studies goes some way towards ensuring their reliability and validity. 
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Figure  5-3: Flicker test conditions 
5.2.4 Procedure 
Potential participants were approached individually at various locations on the 
campus of the University of the Witwatersrand and asked to participate in the 
study. They were verbally informed of the nature of the study and what 
participation would entail. They were told that participation is voluntary, and that 
electing to take part or not would neither advantage nor disadvantage them in any 
way. Those electing to participate were tested on the spot. 
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A laptop computer was placed before them, and they were asked to attend to the 
alternating photographs on the screen, which contained a change, and to press a 
button the moment they noticed the change. The experimenter then recorded the 
number of alternations it took for the participant to notice the change, and asked 
the participant to verbally report what change had taken place, to ensure it was 
accurately detected. 
This was carried out using three different experimental conditions, with each 
participant taking part in only one of these. 
5.2.5 Analysis 
A Kruskal-Wallis test of statistical significance was used in experiment two in 
order to test the relationship between rate of change detection and experimental 
condition. Analysis of variance was selected in this case as there were three 
experimental conditions and the dependent measure was not nominal (number of 
alternations needed to detect the change). A nonparametric analysis of variance 
was appropriate as the results were not normally distributed. 
5.3 Ethical Considerations 
The study relied on volunteers, and every potential participant was issued an 
information sheet which assured them that the choice to participate in the study or 
not was their own, and gave them some indication of what the study entails, as 
well as the details of the experimenter, should they wish to contact her with 
questions in the future. Every potential participant was also issued an informed 
consent form which they signed and returned to the experimenter upon electing to 
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participate in the study.  Anonymity of individuals’ responses was assured, so as 
to make participants feel as comfortable as possible to answer the questions 
honestly and openly. The debriefing following the experiment ensured that 
participants had knowledge of the nature of the study they participated in, and any 
feelings of inadequacy at failing to spot the change were alleviated by the 
experimenter informing participants that this is a common phenomenon. The 
experimenter was available to answer specific questions and address specific 
concerns of participants after the experiment had taken place. Ethics clearance 
was obtained prior to the commencement of the study. For a copy of the ethics 
clearance certificate, see Appendix D. For a copy of the information sheet and 
informed consent form please see Appendix C. 
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6 RESULTS 
6.1 Experiment 1: The Photo Story 
6.1.1 Change Detection 
Table  6-1 shows the levels of change detection for the different conditions in the 
photo story experiment. The different person condition showed the highest levels 
of change detection, with 70 per cent of participants noticing the change. Change 
detection dropped markedly in the remaining conditions, with only 24 per cent, 14 
per cent and 13 per cent of participants noticing the change in the different hair, 
eyes and eyebrows and nose and mouth conditions respectively. 





DID NOT NOTICE 
CHANGE 
TOTAL 
Different Person 63 (70%) 27 (30%) 90 
Different Hair 17 (24%) 54 (76%) 71 
Different Eyes & Eyebrows 10 (14%) 59 (86%) 69 
Different Nose & Mouth 9 (13%) 62 (87%) 71 
TOTAL 99 202 301 
 
Change detection results also showed that a greater percentage of female 
participants than male participants detected the change across all the experimental 
conditions. This is represented in Table  6-2. 
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Table  6-2: Change Detection by Gender 
GENDER NOTICED 
CHANGE 
DID NOT NOTICE 
CHANGE 
TOTAL 
Female 65 (39%) 101 (61%) 166 
Male 34 (25%) 101 (75%) 135 
TOTAL 99 202 301 
 
6.1.2 Logistic Regression Analysis 
In a global analysis of the effects of the different variables in the study on change 
detection, the effect of experimental condition, that is which photo story was 
viewed, was found to be statistically significant at the 5% level of significance 
[Wald chi-square = 58.934, p <.0001], as was the effect of gender [Wald chi-
square = 4.7518, p = 0.0293]. Age, however, was not found to be statistically 
significant [Wald chi-square = 0.9746, p = 0.3235]. There was also no statistically 
significant interaction between gender and experimental condition [Wald chi-
square = 4.2753, p = 0.2332]. 
According to Simonoff (1997), the logistic regression model is appropriate for 
cases where the dependent variable is nominal or dichotomous. In this case, the 
dependent variable is change detection, and it takes on two possible ‘values’: 
noticing, or not noticing the change. Other variables, including other categorical 
variables, can act as predictors for the dependent variable. In this instance, the 
various experimental conditions act as the predictor variables. This is appropriate 
as the question being asked is whether changes to particular facial features are 
more likely to facilitate change detection than others. The logistic regression 
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model generates odds ratios, which are the ratio of odds of the predicted events 
under different conditions. 
Odds ratios were generated using the logistic regression procedure for the 
different hair (H), different eyes and eyebrows (EE) and different nose and mouth 
(NM) conditions with the different person (DP) condition acting as a baseline for 
all of these. Although statistically the choice of baseline is arbitrary, the different 
face condition was the obvious choice in this case as it was reasoned that if a 
given observer is likely to detect a change to a single facial feature then it is 
expected that this observer would certainly detect a change to all facial features. 
The odds ratios for the conditions were as follows: 0.159 for H (different hair), 
0.076 for EE (different eyes and eyebrows), and 0.054 for NM (different nose and 
mouth). Simply put this means that the odds of noticing the change in condition H 
were approximately one sixth the odds of noticing the change in condition DP, the 
odds for EE were approximately one thirteenth the odds for condition DP, and the 
odds for NM were approximately one eighteenth the odds for condition DP. This 
produces a pattern of change detection likelihood where change detection is most 
likely to occur for observers viewing the different face condition, followed by the 
hair, eyes and eyebrows, and nose and mouth conditions, in that order. 
The relationships between individual pairs of conditions were also tested. The 
results are presented in Table  6-3. The probability of noticing the change in 
condition DP was found to be significantly different from all three other 
conditions at the 5% level of significance. The difference between the H and NM 
conditions was also found to be statistically significant at the 5% level of 
    63
significance. The difference between conditions EE and H, and conditions EE and 
NM, however, were not found to be statistically significant at the 5% level. All the 
statistical results generated for this experiment can be found in Appendix E. 
Table  6-3: Contrast Test Results: Condition Comparisons 
CONTRAST DF WALD CHI-SQUARE Pr > CHI-SQUARE 
DP vs. H 1 53.8074 <.0001 
DP vs. E 1 56.7782 <.0001 
DP vs. NM 1 55.7503 <.0001 
H vs. E 1 2.4533 0.1173 
H vs. NM 1 4.2966 0.0382 
E vs. NM 1 0.3616 0.5476 
 
Key:  DP = Different Person, H = Hair, E = Eyes & Eyebrows, NM = Nose & 
Mouth 
6.2 Experiment 2: The Flicker Test 
The results of the flicker test experiment are summarised in Table  6-4. These 
reflect the number of alternations required on average before participants detected 
the change in the various conditions. The H condition produced the fastest rates of 
detection, with a mean of 1.84 (and a median of 2) alternations needed to detect 
the change. This was followed by the EE condition with a mean of 2.72 (and a 
median of 3) alternations and finally the NM condition producing the slowest 
rates of detection with a mean of 4 (and a median of 2) alternations. Results also 
showed that the range of scores (measured in number of alternations) varied in 
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amplitude between the various conditions. The range of scores for the different 
hair, different eyes and eyebrows and different nose and mouth conditions were 
between 1 and 5 alternations, 1 and 12 alternations and 1 and 19 alternations 
respectively. 










Different Hair 25 1.84 (2) 0.99 
Different Eyes & 
Eyebrows 
25 2.72 (3) 2.28 
Different Nose & 
Mouth 
25 4 (2) 4.09 
 
6.2.1 Analysis of Variance 
A histogram generated for results of the flicker test showed that these were not 
normally distributed. Results also showed unequal variances – see the standard 
deviations in Table  6-4 – and so a nonparametric analysis of variance was used 
(For a printout of the histogram please see Appendix F).The Kruskal-Wallis one-
way analysis of variance is a nonparametric test that is analogous to a standard 
one-way analysis of variance but is distribution free and therefore appropriate for 
cases where results are not normally distributed (Howell, 1999). The test is based 
on the null hypothesis that a given number of independent samples being 
compared are from the same population, and when all the observations are ranked, 
(lowest value assigned rank 1, second lowest rank 2 and so on) the expectation is 
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that the mean of the sum of ranks for each group will be equal for all groups 
(Ferguson and Takane, 1989). 
When this statistical procedure was applied to the results of the flicker test there 
was found to be a statistically significant difference in rates of detection between 
the various experimental conditions at the 5% level of significance [chi-square = 
6.445, p = 0.0399]. The mean score of the ranks of each experimental group 
showed that changes in hair were detected faster than changes in eyes and 
eyebrows, which were in turn detected faster than changes in nose and mouth. 
This is represented in Table  6-5. All the statistical results generated for this 
experiment can be found in Appendix G. 
Table  6-5: Summary of Flicker Test Results in the Kruskal-Wallis Analysis 
 
Key:  H = Hair, E = Eyes & Eyebrows, NM = Nose & Mouth 
Mann-Whitney U tests carried out on all the possible pairings of conditions 
showed the difference between the H and NM conditions to be significant, while 
the difference between the H and E and the E and NM were not found to be 








H 25 745.0 950.0 85.913874 29.800 
E 25 988.0 950.0 85.913874 39.520 
NM 25 1117.0 950.0 85.913874 44.680 
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significant. This is similar to the results which emerged from the pair-wise 
comparisons in experiment one.  
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7 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
7.1 Question 1: The Qualitative Description of Change Detection Results 
The rates of detection yielded by experiment one showed that, in the DP condition 
specifically, 70% of participants noticed the change. As mentioned in the 
literature review, this experiment can be said to belong to the narrative paradigm, 
since the images in the stimulus materials formed a story-like narrative sequence, 
and change detection referred to the number of participants who noticed the 
change. Although previous change blindness experiments did not utilize photo 
story stimuli like the one used in this study, the stimuli here were designed to 
mimic the scenarios used in change blindness experiments such as the door study 
(Simons and Levin, 1998, Levin et al., 2002) and the motion picture studies 
(Levin and Simons, 1997). The DP condition specifically mimics the whole object 
changes used in the abovementioned studies. As such, the results of the present 
study contribute to the existing body of work that demonstrates the change 
blindness phenomenon. 
Results from the present study showed higher levels of detection than similar 
studies in the narrative paradigm. For example, in the door study (Simons and 
Levin, 1998), only 47% of participants noticed the change. 
The DP condition is being considered here in isolation for the purpose of 
comparison, since the existing body of work on change blindness includes several 
examples of whole object changes where people were the object of change. The 
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comparatively high rates of change detection yielded by this study could be 
explained in a number of ways. 
The first explanation may relate to sample sizes. In the experiments summarized 
in Table  3-1, of those experiments which were categorised as belonging to the 
narrative paradigm and containing a person switch, sample sizes for each 
experiment ranged from 15 participants (Simons and Levin, 1998) to 39 
participants (Levin et al., 2002) at most. In the present study, 90 participants took 
part in the DP condition of experiment one. It is suggested here that there may be 
a possibility that if all the (narrative paradigm) experiments detailed in Table  3-1 
had sufficiently large samples, the levels of change detection observed for all of 
these might be more similar. 
The second explanation may pertain to the stimulus used in this study as 
compared with the stimuli used in previous studies. Like the present study, 
experiments by Levin and Simons (1997), Simons and Levin (1998), and Levin et 
al. (2002) all used a person as the changing stimulus. In this study, however, the 
two people whose photographs were used in the experimental stimuli were 
selected for their marked dissimilarity in appearance. 
In Kadosh’s (2005) experiment, videos containing an actor switch across camera 
cuts were screened to participants, and the levels of change detection were 
determined using a questionnaire similar to the one used in the present study. Two 
videos were created, one containing black actors and one containing white actors. 
While the relationship between the race of the observer and race of the actors was 
found to have an effect on levels of change detection, it was noted that a 
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surprisingly large number of observers failed to notice the change in the video 
containing a black actor switch, regardless of the observer’s race. During the 
debriefing session, when participants had the opportunity to look at the videos 
again, several people noted that the pair of black actors was far more similar in 
appearance than the white actor pair. This led Kadosh (2005) to note that the 
relative similarity or dissimilarity in appearance of the people in the ‘switch’ may 
have had an impact on the rates of detection. 
It is thus possible that the high rates of change detection in the present study 
resulted from the marked dissimilarity in appearance of the people in the switch, 
and that the levels of similarity (or lack thereof) in appearance of those actors 
used in similar change blindness experiments likewise affected the levels of 
change detection. In order to conclude that this was the case, however, further 
research would be required. 
Furthermore, it may be argued that many previous studies involving people as the 
object of change involved observers undertaking some activity, for example 
giving directions, while exposed to the pre- and post- change stimuli, while 
observers in the present study adopted a more passive role, which may account for 
the higher rates of change detection. Levin et al. (2002) addressed such concerns 
in their experiments, and results did show higher rates of change detection when 
participants adopted a more passive role during pre- and post-change observation 
of the stimuli. This would seem to strengthen the argument for the important role 
of attention in the change blindness phenomenon, since fewer demands on an 
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observer’s attention appear to be associated with higher levels of change 
detection. 
Experiment two, described as belonging to the flicker paradigm, yielded relatively 
fast rates of change detection as compared to other flicker studies. The average 
number of alternations required ranged from 1.84 in the H condition to 4 in the 
NM condition. As discussed in the literature review, the number of alternations 
required, on average, by participants in the Rensink et al. (1997) experiments 
ranged between 7.3 alternations and over 17 alternations. 
The faster rates of detection could best be explained by the choice of stimulus 
images, since this was the main difference between the Rensink et al. (1997) 
experiments and this one, which replicated the Rensink et al. model in every other 
respect. Rensink et al. (1997) did address the question of the effect of the relative 
‘centrality’ or ‘marginality’ of the changing object within the whole image, and 
showed that changes to objects of central interest were detected much faster. As 
noted in the literature review, objects of central interest were defined as those 
objects mentioned by three or more (out of five) observers in brief verbal 
descriptions of the images. Although this exercise was not carried out in the 
present study, it is possible that the facial features which underwent changes in 
experiment two would have been mentioned more frequently by naïve describers. 
That is, it is possible that these features are more salient than the objects of central 
interest as defined by the Rensink et al. (1997) study. Thus, the fast rates of 
detection observed here may be due to the use of a face as the changing image, the 
fact that the face was in the foreground and took up a large amount of space in the 
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image, and the fact that the rest of the image was sparse and uncluttered. As such 
it could be said that the nature and composition of the experimental stimulus has 
an impact on change detection, and would make an interesting topic for future 
research. 
In summary, across both experiments and all conditions, some level of failure of 
change detection (in experiment one) or delays in detection (in experiment two) 
were observed. This demonstrates the robustness of the change blindness 
phenomenon and contributes to the growing body of experimental work on the 
topic. 
7.2 Questions 2 and 3: The Effect of Facial Feature Transformations on 
Change Detection and Implications 
The pattern which emerged from the results of both experiments suggests that hair 
changes are more likely to facilitate change detection than changes to eyes and 
eyebrows, which in turn are more likely to facilitate detection than changes to 
noses and mouths. In the results section it was noted that while in experiment one 
the differences between the H and NM conditions were significant, the differences 
between the H and the EE conditions and the EE and NM conditions were not 
found to be statistically significant. However, the logistic regression analysis 
showed, based on the resulting odds ratios, that change detection did follow the 
pattern described above. This pattern can be interpreted in the context of change 
blindness and its possible underlying causes by turning back to the discussion in 
the literature review. 
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It was noted that in studies of the recognition and memory for individual facial 
features some features emerged as more salient than others. Hair emerged as the 
most salient of these features, with eyes ranking somewhat lower in salience and 
noses and mouths less salient still (Shepherd et al., 1981). These findings guided 
the construction of the experimental stimuli in the present study. The feature 
which was expected to be most salient, namely hair, was associated with higher 
levels of change detection that those features expected to be somewhat less 
salient, namely eyes, noses and mouths. When applied to the change blindness 
phenomenon this could have a number of implications. 
Firstly, returning to Rensink’s coherence theory of focused attention, it was 
suggested that focused attention is required to see change across interruptions, as 
such focused attention would act as a ‘hand’ that grasps a number of proto-
objects, affording them the spatial and temporal coherence required to maintain 
their identity even across a masked transient. What the findings of the present 
study may begin to tell us is what objects or combination of objects this 
metaphorical ‘hand’ is most likely to ‘grasp’. 
It appears that the more salient features of an image are more likely to receive 
focused attention, and therefore less likely to produce change blindness than other, 
less salient features. It may be argued that data on feature salience is not 
unambiguous, which may allow for alternative explanations of the results of the 
present research. For example, it could be said that the relatively high rates of 
detection in the H condition were not the result of hair being the most salient 
feature per se, but that the position of the hair on the border or frame of the face 
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may facilitate detection due to changes in figure-ground outline. A response to 
this would be that the framing effect of hair is an aspect that contributes to its 
relative salience, and may form part of the salience explanation as opposed to an 
alternative explanation. The question of what it is that renders some features more 
salient than others is not in question here, but rather which features, when altered, 
will produce higher levels of change detection. While it was not feasible in the 
present study, future research may employ strategies such as eye-tracking 
techniques in order to more accurately assess what parts of the face receive the 
most attention in facial recognition tasks and integrate these with change 
blindness tasks. 
While it was already noted in the discussion of the differences between face and 
object recognition that the findings of this study may not be directly applicable to 
stimuli other than faces, this nevertheless serves as a starting point, and 
investigation of the role of feature salience of other objects in change blindness 
experiments is recommended for possible future research. 
Secondly, the literature review included a discussion of the possibility that change 
blindness results from a failure to compare pre- and post-change objects, despite 
these being adequately retained in memory. The findings of the present study 
showed that some facial features when changed produced higher incidences of 
change blindness (in experiment one) or slower rates of change detection (as in 
experiment two). This goes some way towards challenging the comparison failure 
hypothesis. 
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The reasoning for this is that if the pre- and post-change images are adequately 
retained by the observer, and it is only a failure to compare the two that produces 
change blindness, then it would be expected that the different experimental 
conditions, such as the variations of the photo story used, would produce similar 
levels of change detection. This was not the case. As such it is suggested that 
comparison failure is not a sufficient explanation of the occurrence of change 
blindness.  
This reasoning, however, does not necessarily rule out potential rival explanations 
of change blindness, such as processing failures at the level of encoding or 
retaining visual representations – in other words – memory. Although a pattern 
emerged where changes to various facial features produced different levels of 
change detection, and this weakens the comparison failure argument, it does not 
necessarily rule out the possibility that the relative salience of a feature will affect 
one’s likelihood to visually represent and remember that feature over time, as 
opposed to simply affecting the likelihood to attend to that feature in the first 
instance.  
However, research shows that good visual representations can be retained and 
remain accessible even under conditions that lead to change blindness (Varakin & 
Levin, 2006). This would suggest that poor memory for visual information cannot 
be solely responsible for the occurrence of change blindness. This puzzling 
finding led the researchers to stress the importance of distinguishing between what 
we are cognitively capable of doing and what we generally tend to do. Indeed, 
studies investigating the intentional control of visual memory show that 
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individuals are able to intentionally forget some items from an array being studied 
in order to improve recall of the remaining items (Yotsumoto & Sekuler, 2006). 
Yotsumoto and Sekuler (2006) noted that the visual system selectively filters 
incoming information, in order to ensure that it remains manageable, but that 
exclusion occurs after the excluded items receive considerable visual processing. 
This discussion is not dissimilar to the ideas put forward by Noe (2002), Clark 
(2002) and Mack (2002), in terms of suggesting that we have perceptual access to 
the visual world around us and stressing the important role of intention. It does 
suggest, however, that this intentional directing of visual experience occurs at a 
deeper level of processing, namely, memory, as opposed to attention. 
Taken together, these various discussions and research findings point to possible 
links between attention, visual representations and memory in the context of 
change blindness, and so would call for more integrated research in the future. 
The focus of this research and the interpretation of its findings are, however, 
pitched at the level of attention. The reason for this is, firstly, that the role of 
attention in the change blindness phenomenon has been the focus of more 
theoretical discussion and research than the role of memory, and this is 
presumably because processing at the level of attention would seem to logically 
precede processing at the level of memory. In other words, it would be more 
sensible to explore possible failures of change detection at this level before 
attending to the questions surrounding deeper levels of processing. Secondly, and 
more importantly – as Varakin and Levin (2006) noted in their investigation of the 
relationship between visual memory and change blindness – although memory for 
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visual representations can be good, people may still generally fail to detect 
changes to objects. The focus here is therefore on what visual experience in 
response to changing visual stimuli is generally like, as opposed to what it is 
potentially capable of, under special circumstances. From an operational 
standpoint alone, it is more efficient to first address those questions relating to 
more overt behaviour that can be more easily tested and measured (for example 
what parts of images we attend to and how this impacts on change detection). 
An interesting result that emerged in experiment one is the large difference in 
change detection between the DP condition (70%) and the three other conditions 
(24%, 14%, and 13%) containing isolated facial feature transformations. The 
differences in the latter conditions were accounted for here by asserting that cue 
salience plays a role in change detection, but in order to interpret the relatively 
high levels of change detection for the different person condition, we return to the 
discussion of the various theories of visual experience presented in the literature 
review. 
The claims of Noe (2002), Clark (2002) and Mack (2002), were compared and 
brought together to reveal an understanding of the nature of conscious visual 
experience which suggests that we do have a sense of a complete and rich visual 
world that is accessible to conscious awareness, and this sense is not an illusion. 
We have perceptual access to the world via our knowledge of sensorimotor 
contingencies (Noe, 2002) that allow us to attend, at will, to various aspects of a 
scene. In addition to this sensorimotor knowledge, our visual experience is 
mediated by semantic and memory-based knowledge which both informs our 
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vision-related actions and our interpretation of the gist or meaning of scenes, 
which in turn directs our visual attention (Clark, 2002, Mack, 2002, and Noe, 
2002). 
These assertions can be used to interpret the high levels of detection recorded for 
the DP condition in experiment one. In this condition, the final frame of the photo 
story contained a photo of a person (let us say person B) not previously seen in the 
story, standing in the place that the narrative and one’s expectation would dictate 
that the original occupant of the house (let us say person A) should be standing. 
This would have strongly affected the meaning, or gist of the story, and so, 
according to Mack (2002), would have attracted attention, in the form of 
conscious visual awareness of the change, that is change detection. The three 
other experimental conditions still contained person A in the final frame, only 
with some or other feature altered. The fact that person A was still there means 
that the gist or meaning of the story was less strongly affected by the change, and 
therefore attracted less attention, which resulted in much lower levels of change 
detection. To take this argument a step further, results of experiment two showed 
that when the gist or semantic understanding of the relationship between the 
images was of less importance (recall that this experiment fits into the flicker 
paradigm, so participants were actively looking for change between two still 
images, with no story or narrative dictating an expected relationship between 
them) the changes were detected extremely quickly. This demonstrates that while 
the change blindness phenomenon appears to be related to a failure at the level of 
purely perceptual mechanisms – there were delays in detection in experiment two 
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– the semantic content of the images also has an important effect on one’s 
likelihood to notice, or fail to notice, change. 
On the other hand, the fact that thirty per cent of participants failed to notice the 
change in the different person condition can be accounted for by the 
abovementioned discussion of visual experience as well. Our perceptual access to 
detailed visual information means that we are neither required to nor inclined to 
attend to all aspects of a scene all at once. While under normal circumstances this 
affords us the ability to process visual information efficiently and glean the gist of 
visual scenes quite accurately, in some cases this can result in errors, such as 
missing changes in change blindness experiments. As discussed above, however, 
this understanding may not provide a complete picture of all the variables 
involved in the change blindness phenomenon, and as mentioned, memory may be 
an additional variable affecting the observed levels of detection failure. In order to 
tease out all the variables involved in the process of change detection, more 
integrated research would be called for in the future. 
Another finding of interest which emerged, although it was not explicit in the 
aims of the study, is the relationship between change detection and gender. In 
experiment one, a chi-square analysis of the results showed that females were 
better at detecting changes than were men. It should be noted, however, that the 
experimental stimuli contained men’s faces. This could potentially be an 
influencing factor, and more extensive investigation of the role of gender in the 
change blindness phenomenon would be required before conclusions could be 
drawn. 
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Returning to the comments made in the literature review about the possible 
practical application of the findings of the present study, the above assertion that 
the more salient facial features are more likely to receive focused attention and 
therefore less likely to be susceptible to change blindness could be used to inform 
decisions relating to eye-witness testimony. For example, it was noted that feature 
retrieval techniques are used when presenting ‘mug shots’ to eye-witnesses for 
identification (Lee et al., 2004). That is, based on an initial subjective description 
of the suspect by the witness, photographs of offenders are presented to the 
witness in order of decreasing resemblance to their description as opposed to 
presenting witnesses with all available photographs. Knowledge of which facial 
features are less likely to lead to instances of change blindness could be helpful in 
directing the focus of such processes, constructing identification composites and 
so on, particularly in instances where the scene of the crime involved larger 
numbers of people or commotion, potentially leading to instances of change 
blindness. 
7.3 Conclusion 
A great deal of interest has been shown in the change blindness phenomenon, and 
its role within cognitive psychology. The surprising nature and robustness of the 
phenomenon have spurred a large volume of research that not only demonstrates 
the phenomenon itself but attempts to uncover its underlying causes, and in so 
doing create a deeper understanding of how visual information is processed under 
normal circumstances. This research attempted to contribute to this body of work 
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by beginning to address the question of what draws attention to some scene 
elements and not others in a change detection task. 
The primary aim of the study was to explore whether some facial features, when 
altered, were more likely to result in change blindness than others, in a change 
blindness experiment involving a person as the object of change. Findings from 
studies of the salience of facial features were used as a general guide, in order to 
determine if feature salience could be an influencing factor in drawing attention 
and therefore facilitating change detection. It was found that those features 
considered to be more salient, such as hair, indeed produced higher levels of 
change detection than those features considered less salient, such as noses and 
mouths. It is therefore concluded that the more salient aspects of an image are 
most likely to draw preferential attention in a change detection task, specifically in 
tasks involving images of faces or people. 
A secondary aim of the study was to take the findings derived from the primary 
investigation and use these inferentially towards deepening an understanding of 
the possible mechanisms underlying the change blindness phenomenon. The 
results obtained appear to challenge, to some extent, the hypothesis that change 
blindness results from a failure to make between-view comparisons. This would 
suggest that the role of attention is more central to the phenomenon. 
Finally, the findings of this study, when taken together with the theoretical 
discussion of the nature of visual experience addressed in the literature review led 
to the following conclusion: in order to see change, we need attention, and in 
order to attract attention, visual aspects (or changes to these) have to be both 
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salient and meaningful. As such, the visual ‘blunders’ demonstrated by change 
blindness do not necessarily represent a flaw in our visual processing abilities, but 
rather the efficiency with which we normally interpret our visual world. 
7.4 Limitations and Recommendations 
7.4.1 Limitations of Experimental Design 
Due to time constraints and the difficulty of accessing large samples, there was no 
random assignment of volunteers into the different experimental conditions. 
Random assignment is recommended based on the reasoning that if a group of 
subjects is recruited for a study and then randomly assigned to the various 
experimental conditions, the likelihood that the subjects in one experimental 
group will be fairly similar to the subjects in another experimental group with 
regards to all possible variables other than the independent variable being tested, 
increases (Babbie & Mouton, 2001). The advantage of this is that it strengthens 
the argument that the observed effects on the dependent variable are related to the 
independent variable, and not other variables. However, given that the 
phenomenon has been repeatedly demonstrated and replicated and has been 
shown to be robust, it is fair to assume that the possible effects of extraneous 
variables would not be of great concern. Furthermore, random assignment was 
sacrificed in an effort to gain access to larger samples, and indeed, the samples 
used in the present study were much larger than samples used in similar change 
blindness experiments (for example Simons and Levin, 1998, Levin et al., 2002). 
Statistical analysis for experiment one showed that there was no relationship 
between age and change detection, and no gender-condition interaction, which 
    82
suggests that these variables did not necessarily affect the change detection pattern 
observed in the results. However, as noted in Chapter  5, some participants viewed 
the photo story in large groups, and others in significantly smaller groups, or 
individually. It is possible that viewing it in a group affected the results in that 
participants may have gauged others’ reactions, causing them to notice the change 
when they otherwise would not have done. It might be inferred, however, from the 
generally low levels of change detection in most of the experimental conditions 
that group membership as opposed to individual viewing did not have a large 
impact on the results. In addition, it is worth noting that the experimenter was 
present during all the trials (group and individual), and did not note the tendency 
of participants to communicate or discuss the experiment while it was taking 
place. 
7.4.2 Limitations of Instruments 
In the photographic images used in experiment one, the original image of the 
occupant of the house and the image used in the DP condition also differed 
slightly in background (see Figure  5-1). This may have had an effect on rates of 
change detection that were not accounted for by the person switch, and as such are 
noted as a limitation. However, given that the focus of this research was more 
specifically on those conditions involving individual facial feature 
transformations, and the backgrounds were identical for all the images used in 
these, this limitation should not greatly affect the conclusions drawn from the 
results of this study. Furthermore, of those participants who did notice the change 
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in this condition, none mentioned the changes in the background of the image in 
their questionnaire responses. All noted the changing person in the foreground. 
Additionally, as noted in the literature review, the use of a face as an experimental 
stimulus could be a limiting factor to the extent that the findings of this study may 
not be directly applicable to change blindness experiments containing non-face 
objects as the changing stimulus. Furthermore, in experiment one, the still photo 
images used may have been a limiting factor in a number of ways. Firstly, it is 
possible that the changes to isolated facial features in the final frame were 
interpreted as the same face presented at a different angle, making it look 
somewhat different, but not creating the impression that the said features had been 
replaced, especially in the eyes and eyebrows and nose and mouth conditions. 
Experiment two overcomes this potential problem to some extent, as participants 
were actively looking for an expected change. 
Secondly, although the photo story stimuli can be considered more naturalistic 
than some experimental stimuli used in change blindness experiments in the past, 
photographic images preclude information that could facilitate change detection, 
such as voice quality and physical gestures and mannerisms. Although audio 
narration was used in the photo story experiment in place of written captions 
(which may have been a visual distraction for observers), a single narrator spoke 
for all the characters in the story. This is unlike change blindness experiments 
involving a person switch in real world interactions, where the voice quality of the 
individuals may act as another identifying feature which could facilitate change 
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detection. The recommendations for future research that emerge from the general 
discussion above and the abovementioned limitations are discussed below. 
7.4.3 Recommendations for Future Research 
Given the differences between the mechanisms for face and object recognition, 
the findings of this study may not be directly applicable to the occurrence of 
change blindness involving non-face scenes or objects, and thus it is 
recommended that the role of cue salience for objects other than faces be 
investigated in the context of the change blindness phenomenon. Such 
investigations could mimic the experiments in the present study while using 
changes to objects or animals in place of people. While ‘features’ of objects do 
not necessarily correspond directly to the way we understand features of faces, 
such investigations could elaborate on aspects such as shape, colour and 
orientation of objects or parts of objects and the relative salience of these in the 
context of the facilitation of change detection. 
Secondly, the present study’s findings in the flicker test experiment showed faster 
rates of change detection than the Rensink et al. (1997) findings, and this was 
attributed to the nature of the images used. This could form the basis of future 
research into the relationship between the nature of visual scenes and images and 
change blindness. Investigations could highlight aspects of visual images which 
could potentially facilitate or hinder change detection, such as the number of items 
in each image, the locations of the changing item within an image (for example 
background or foreground), and the relative size of the changing item, and so on. 
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Thirdly, the findings that gender had an effect on the likelihood of noticing 
change in this experiment is also interesting and warrants future investigation. 
Fourthly, the limitations in the design and instruments used in this study discussed 
above could be considered when pursuing research of a similar nature. Random 
assignment, where possible, would be recommended to limit the effects of 
extraneous variables on the measure of interest. For change blindness experiments 
involving people as the objects of change, while the use of video clips were not 
technologically feasible in the present study (since isolated facial features were 
altered), it would be recommended, where possible, to use experimental stimuli 
that allow the inclusion of identifying cues such as voice and gesture, which may 
be important in facilitating change detection in real world scenarios. 
Most importantly, however, would be the recommendation to address the 
differences between experimental paradigms in change blindness studies. As 
noted in the literature review and the discussion above, demonstration of the 
change blindness phenomenon within different experimental paradigms, that is 
narrative and flicker paradigms, could have important implications for the 
underlying mechanisms involved in change blindness and visual perception in 
general. This distinction has, to date, not been made explicit in the literature, and 
is strongly recommended for future investigation. 
Careful consideration at the operational level would be required in order to tease 
out the potential differences between the role of narrative or semantic 
continuity/consistency (which, as suggested here, may hinder change detection if 
the change fails to disrupt these) and the role of purely visual, perceptual 
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mechanisms (which, when unrelated to semantic consistency, are argued above to 
increase the likelihood of noticing change). Recent investigations have begun to 
touch on the role of the semantic versus the visual nature of changing objects in 
the context of change blindness, such as Hollingworth and Henderson (2002), 
who ensured that the change detection in their experiments relied on visual 
information by utilising ‘token-level’ changes to objects, in which objects were 
replaced by objects from the same semantic category. While Hollingworth and 
Henderson (2002) restricted their focus to the flicker paradigm, it would be 
recommended that future investigations extend such considerations into the 
broader context of different experimental paradigms. 
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Alternative Slide 8 – Different Hair 
 
Alternative Slide 8 – Different Eyes 
 
Alternative Slide 8 – Different Nose 
and Mouth 
 
NB: Although subtitles appear on these slides, audio narration was used in the 
actual experiment. 
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APPENDIX B: QUESTIONNAIRE 
Questionnaire Page 1 
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Questionnaire Page 2 
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Questionnaire Page 3 
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APPENDIX C: INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
Informed Consent Form – Page 1 
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Informed Consent Form – Page 2 
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APPENDIX E: LOGISTIC REGRESSION 
The following is a logistic regression analysis carried out on the results from 
experiment one, including pair-wise comparisons of all the conditions, and 
generated by SAS. 
Key: WF: Different person condition, H: Different hair condition, E: Different 
eyes and eyebrows condition, NM: Different nose and mouth condition.  
 
 
Logistic Regression Results 
 
The LOGISTIC Procedure 
 
 
Generated by the SAS System (Local, XP_PRO) on 21NOV2006 at  4:02 PM 101
Model Information 
Data Set WORK.SORT3465  
Response Variable NOTICED NOTICED 
Number of Response Levels 2  
Model binary logit  
Optimization Technique Fisher's scoring  
 
 
Number of Observations Read 299 








1 Y 97 
2 N 200 
 
Probability modeled is NOTICED='Y'. 
 
Note: 2 observations were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory variables. 
 
 






GENDER F 1   
 M -1   
CONDITION E 1 0 0 
 H 0 1 0 
 NM 0 0 1 
 WF 0 0 0 
 
 
Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
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The LOGISTIC Procedure 
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AIC 377.256 302.706 
SC 380.950 335.949 
-2 Log L 375.256 284.706 
 
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test 
Chi-
Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 90.5501 8 <.0001 
Score 89.3411 8 <.0001 
Wald 70.5433 8 <.0001 
 
 




Square Pr > ChiSq 
AGE 1 0.9746 0.3235 
CONDITION 3 58.9340 <.0001 
GENDER 1 4.7518 0.0293 
GENDER*CONDITION 3 4.2753 0.2332 
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Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 





Square Pr > ChiSq 
Standardize
d Estimate Exp(Est) 
Intercept   1 -0.8247 1.5947 0.2674 0.6050  0.438 
AGE   1 0.0780 0.0790 0.9746 0.3235 0.0812 1.081 
CONDITION E  1 -2.5717 0.4400 34.1633 <.0001  0.076 
CONDITION H  1 -1.8404 0.3719 24.4891 <.0001  0.159 
CONDITION NM  1 -2.9151 0.4952 34.6480 <.0001  0.054 
GENDER F  1 0.5301 0.2432 4.7518 0.0293  1.699 
GENDER*CONDITION F E 1 -0.8890 0.4449 3.9921 0.0457  0.411 
GENDER*CONDITION F H 1 -0.0914 0.3722 0.0603 0.8060  0.913 
GENDER*CONDITION F NM 1 -0.3109 0.4937 0.3965 0.5289  0.733 
 
 






AGE 1.081 0.926 1.262 
 
 




80.1 Somers' D 0.622 
Percent Discordant 17.8 Gamma 0.636 
Percent Tied 2.1 Tau-a 0.275 
Pairs 19400 c 0.811 
 
 
Profile Likelihood Confidence Interval for Parameters 
Parameter   Estimate 95% Confidence Limits 
Intercept   -0.8247 -3.9430 2.3473 
AGE   0.0780 -0.0787 0.2334 
CONDITION E  -2.5717 -3.5051 -1.7561 
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Profile Likelihood Confidence Interval for Parameters 
Parameter   Estimate 95% Confidence Limits 
CONDITION H  -1.8404 -2.5922 -1.1288 
CONDITION NM  -2.9151 -4.0125 -2.0187 
GENDER F  0.5301 0.0561 1.0149 
GENDER*CONDITION F E -0.8890 -1.8184 -0.0428 
GENDER*CONDITION F H -0.0914 -0.8200 0.6470 
GENDER*CONDITION F NM -0.3109 -1.2335 0.7702 
 
 
Wald Confidence Interval for Parameters 
Parameter   Estimate 95% Confidence Limits 
Intercept   -0.8247 -3.9502 2.3008 
AGE   0.0780 -0.0769 0.2329 
CONDITION E  -2.5717 -3.4341 -1.7094 
CONDITION H  -1.8404 -2.5692 -1.1115 
CONDITION NM  -2.9151 -3.8858 -1.9445 
GENDER F  0.5301 0.0535 1.0066 
GENDER*CONDITION F E -0.8890 -1.7610 -0.0169 
GENDER*CONDITION F H -0.0914 -0.8210 0.6382 
GENDER*CONDITION F NM -0.3109 -1.2785 0.6568 
 
 
Profile Likelihood Confidence Interval for 
Adjusted Odds Ratios 
Effect Unit Estimate 95% Confidence Limits 
AGE 1.0000 1.081 0.924 1.263 
 
 
Wald Confidence Interval for Adjusted Odds 
Ratios 
Effect Unit Estimate 95% Confidence Limits 
AGE 1.0000 1.081 0.926 1.262 
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Square Pr > ChiSq 
E vs H 1 2.4533 0.1173 
E vs NM 1 0.3616 0.5476 
H vs NM 1 4.2966 0.0382 
E vs WF 1 56.7782 <.0001 
H vs WF 1 53.8074 <.0001 
NM vs WF 1 55.7503 <.0001 
 
 
Contrast Rows Estimation and Testing Results 









Square Pr > ChiSq 
E vs H PARM 1 -0.7314 0.4669 0.05 -1.6466 0.1838 2.4533 0.1173 
E vs H EXP 1 0.4812 0.2247 0.05 0.1927 1.2018 2.4533 0.1173 
E vs NM PARM 1 0.3434 0.5711 0.05 -0.7759 1.4627 0.3616 0.5476 
E vs NM EXP 1 1.4097 0.8051 0.05 0.4603 4.3176 0.3616 0.5476 
H vs NM PARM 1 1.0748 0.5185 0.05 0.0585 2.0910 4.2966 0.0382 
H vs NM EXP 1 2.9293 1.5189 0.05 1.0603 8.0932 4.2966 0.0382 
E vs WF PARM 1 -9.8989 1.3137 0.05 -12.4737 -7.3241 56.7782 <.0001 
E vs WF EXP 1 0.000050 0.000066 0.05 3.826E-6 0.000659 56.7782 <.0001 
H vs WF PARM 1 -9.1675 1.2498 0.05 -11.6171 -6.7180 53.8074 <.0001 
H vs WF EXP 1 0.000104 0.000130 0.05 9.011E-6 0.00121 53.8074 <.0001 
NM vs WF PARM 1 -10.2423 1.3717 0.05 -12.9309 -7.5537 55.7503 <.0001 
NM vs WF EXP 1 0.000036 0.000049 0.05 2.422E-6 0.000524 55.7503 <.0001 
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0.040 97 0 200 0 32.7 100.0 0.0 67.3 . 
0.060 95 0 200 2 32.0 97.9 0.0 67.8 100.0 
0.080 92 2 198 5 31.6 94.8 1.0 68.3 71.4 
0.100 90 24 176 7 38.4 92.8 12.0 66.2 22.6 
0.120 87 53 147 10 47.1 89.7 26.5 62.8 15.9 
0.140 86 82 118 11 56.6 88.7 41.0 57.8 11.8 
0.160 78 91 109 19 56.9 80.4 45.5 58.3 17.3 
0.180 76 129 71 21 69.0 78.4 64.5 48.3 14.0 
0.200 73 142 58 24 72.4 75.3 71.0 44.3 14.5 
0.220 72 147 53 25 73.7 74.2 73.5 42.4 14.5 
0.240 72 152 48 25 75.4 74.2 76.0 40.0 14.1 
0.260 72 152 48 25 75.4 74.2 76.0 40.0 14.1 
0.280 72 152 48 25 75.4 74.2 76.0 40.0 14.1 
0.300 67 153 47 30 74.1 69.1 76.5 41.2 16.4 
0.320 63 155 45 34 73.4 64.9 77.5 41.7 18.0 
0.340 63 164 36 34 76.4 64.9 82.0 36.4 17.2 
0.360 63 170 30 34 78.5 64.9 85.0 32.3 16.7 
0.380 62 171 29 35 78.5 63.9 85.5 31.9 17.0 
0.400 62 173 27 35 79.1 63.9 86.5 30.3 16.8 
0.420 62 173 27 35 79.1 63.9 86.5 30.3 16.8 
0.440 62 173 27 35 79.1 63.9 86.5 30.3 16.8 
0.460 62 173 27 35 79.1 63.9 86.5 30.3 16.8 
0.480 62 173 27 35 79.1 63.9 86.5 30.3 16.8 
0.500 61 173 27 36 78.8 62.9 86.5 30.7 17.2 
0.520 53 173 27 44 76.1 54.6 86.5 33.8 20.3 
0.540 52 175 25 45 76.4 53.6 87.5 32.5 20.5 
0.560 51 181 19 46 78.1 52.6 90.5 27.1 20.3 
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0.580 48 184 16 49 78.1 49.5 92.0 25.0 21.0 
0.600 47 184 16 50 77.8 48.5 92.0 25.4 21.4 
0.620 46 185 15 51 77.8 47.4 92.5 24.6 21.6 
0.640 45 185 15 52 77.4 46.4 92.5 25.0 21.9 
0.660 45 186 14 52 77.8 46.4 93.0 23.7 21.8 
0.680 44 186 14 53 77.4 45.4 93.0 24.1 22.2 
0.700 44 186 14 53 77.4 45.4 93.0 24.1 22.2 
0.720 44 186 14 53 77.4 45.4 93.0 24.1 22.2 
0.740 43 187 13 54 77.4 44.3 93.5 23.2 22.4 
0.760 34 188 12 63 74.7 35.1 94.0 26.1 25.1 
0.780 6 191 9 91 66.3 6.2 95.5 60.0 32.3 
0.800 2 196 4 95 66.7 2.1 98.0 66.7 32.6 
0.820 1 198 2 96 67.0 1.0 99.0 66.7 32.7 
0.840 0 200 0 97 67.3 0.0 100.0 . 32.7 
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APPENDIX F: HISTOGRAM FOR FLICKER TEST RESULTS 
The following is a histogram generated using SAS showing the results obtained in 
experiment two. 
 
Distribution analysis of: Alt 
 
The UNIVARIATE Procedure 
Fitted Distribution for Alt 
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Moments 
N 75 Sum Weights 75 
Mean 2.85333333 Sum Observations 214 
Std Deviation 2.86966112 Variance 8.23495495 
Skewness 3.38720734 Kurtosis 14.5403124 
Uncorrected SS 1220 Corrected SS 609.386667 
Coeff Variation 100.572236 Std Error Mean 0.33135992 
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The UNIVARIATE Procedure 
Fitted Distribution for Alt 
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Distribution analysis of: Alt 
 
The UNIVARIATE Procedure 
Fitted Distribution for Alt 
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Parameters for Normal 
Distribution 
Paramete
r Symbol Estimate 
Mean Mu 2.853333 
Std Dev Sigma 2.869661 
 
 
Goodness-of-Fit Tests for Normal Distribution 
Test Statistic p Value 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov D 0.30628584 Pr > D <0.010 
Cramer-von Mises W-Sq 1.55324663 Pr > W-Sq <0.005 
Anderson-Darling A-Sq 8.37767800 Pr > A-Sq <0.005 
 
 






1.0 1.00000 -3.82250 
5.0 1.00000 -1.86684 
10.0 1.00000 -0.82429 
25.0 1.00000 0.91778 
50.0 2.00000 2.85333 
75.0 3.00000 4.78889 
90.0 6.00000 6.53095 
95.0 9.00000 7.57351 
99.0 19.00000 9.52916 
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APPENDIX G: KRUSKAL – WALLIS 
The following is a Kruskal-Wallis analysis of the results obtained in experiment 
two, generated by SAS. 
Key: H: Different hair condition, E: Different eyes and eyebrows condition, 
NM: Different nose and mouth condition. 
 
Nonparametric One-Way ANOVA 
 
The NPAR1WAY Procedure 
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Wilcoxon Scores (Rank Sums) for Variable Alt 











H 25 745.0 950.0 85.913874 29.800 
E 25 988.0 950.0 85.913874 39.520 
NM 25 1117.0 950.0 85.913874 44.680 






Pr > Chi-Square 0.0399 
 
 
Nonparametric One-Way ANOVA 
 
The NPAR1WAY Procedure 
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Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for Variable Alt 







H 25 0.800 1.00 
E 25 0.480 -0.60 
NM 25 0.520 -0.40 
Total 75 0.600  
Maximum Deviation Occurred at Observation 31 




KS 0.142361 KSa 1.232883 
 
 
Cramer-von Mises Test for Variable Alt 





H 25 0.484741 
E 25 0.112652 
NM 25 0.307852 
 
Cramer-von Mises Statistics 
(Asymptotic) 
CM 0.012070 CMa 0.905244 
 
